Department of the Treasury press releases

Economy Statement for the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: August 3 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Economy Statement for the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee Introduction The economy under the Trump Administration is strong, supported by robust business investment in equipment and intellectual property products, as well as solid household consumption growth. Data on investments, sales, and earnings indicate that the economy is poised for continued expansion. Business investment rose by nearly 10% at an annual rate over the first half of 2026 , driven by investments in new equipment and intellectual property. On the labor side, employment growth accelerated in the second quarter, with 334,000 net new jobs added. Annual worker wage growth continues to outpace inflation, and the unemployment rate remains low. Despite recent increases in volatility of prices linked to the Iran conflict, the U.S. economy is increasingly resilient to fluctuations in availability of oil supply from the Strait of Hormuz . The United States is the largest producer of petroleum and natural gas and is increasingly a net exporter of both, strengthening energy resilience to supply shocks. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) According to the advance estimate, real GDP grew by 1.5% at an annual rate in the second quarter of 2026 (2Q26), following the 2.1% advance in 1Q26 . However, the slower pace of headline growth belied stronger core demand by the private sector, which reflects consumer and business confidence in the economy and signals a solid base for future growth . Personal consumption expenditures ( PCE), which account for roughly two-thirds of the U.S. economy, was the strongest contributor to GDP growth. PCE growth accelerated sharply to 3.2% from the previous quarter’s 0.5 % rate, adding 2.1 percentage points to real GDP growth. Consumer spending on goods (led by prescription drugs and motor vehicles and parts) as well as services (led by food services and accommodations) picked up in 2Q. Business fixed investment (BFI) remained very strong, growing by 8.4% in 2Q26 and adding 1.2 percentage points to growth after surging by over 10% in the previous quarter. Equipment investment remained rapid at 15.2%, roughly matching the first quarter’s pace. In 2Q, equipment spending was broadly based, with strong spending on industrial equipment, transportation equipment, and information processing equipment. Investment in intellectual property products expanded by 8.8%, reflecting businesses’ investment in software , as well as research and development. Although structures investment declined on net, spending on data centers continued to grow at a double-digit pace. Residential investment increased for the first time in six quarters, rising by 1.5 percent and adding 0.1 percentage point to real GDP. Spending on single-family structures and brokers’ commissions. (The latter mainly reflects rising existing home sales drove the ) In total, private domestic final purchases – the combination of PCE, BFI, and residential investment – rose 3.9% at an annual rate in 2Q26, the strongest pace in over three years. Of the remaining components of GDP, there was a decline in net exports. Growth slowed for exports of goods and services – though exports of petroleum and related products rose at the strongest pace since 2017. Meanwhile growth of imports maintained a strong, steady pace, largely reflecting more imports of capital equipment. On balance, net exports subtracted 1.0 percentage points from GDP growth. In addition, the change in private inventories and total government spending also subtracted from economic growth – though the latter largely reflects an accounting identity as sales from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve counted as demand among other GDP components. Altogether, these components subtracted 0.8 percentage points from real GDP growth in 2Q26. Labor Markets Job growth accelerated notably in 2Q26, and other measures of labor market health either improved or remained relatively stable (see Table 2 – Labor Market Indicators). Unemployment claims in mid-July fell to the lowest since 1969. Although the headline labor force participation rate (LFPR) continued to ease due to underlying demographic pressures, the prime-age (ages 25 to 54) LFPR remained at a high level. Job openings increased in both absolute terms and relative to the number of vacancies per unemployed person. For the second consecutive quarter, the pace of net total (private and public) job creation accelerated, primarily reflecting private sector hiring. After increasing sharply to an average of 73,000 per month during 1Q26 from late 2025, job growth increased again in the latest quarter to an average 111,000 per month. The private sector continued to lead job growth. In 2Q26, average job growth in the private sector increased to 99,000 per month, after more than tripling from 4Q25 to a pace of 78,000 per month in 1Q26. Government payrolls increased in 2Q26, after declining in the previous two quarters related to the end of the Deferred Resignation Program. In 2Q26, the government sector added an average of 13,000 jobs per month. Net job growth in 2Q26 exceeded most estimates of breakeven employment growth, helping to keep the unemployment rate broadly stable. In 2Q26, the unemployment rate remained at the 1Q average of 4.3%, in line with mainstream estimates of the rate of unemployment that is consistent with stable inflation and excludes fluctuations in aggregate demand. In June 2026, the unemployment rate improved further to 4.2%. Wage growth continued to be strong in the second quarter: nominal average hourly earnings (AHE) for all employees in June 2026 were up 3.5% since June 2025 and average weekly earnings were up 3.8% over this period. Adjusted for inflation, real wage growth (average hourly and weekly earnings, deflated by CPI) was up on a year-over-year basis across both measures. The difference between AHE and AWE growth reflects a small increase in average weekly work hours. Real AHE increased 0.1% over the year ending in June while real AWE increased 0.3% over the year. The report on quarterly weekly earnings for full-time workers showed particularly strong nominal growth in 2Q26, especially for lower-income workers. In 2Q, seasonally adjusted median usual weekly earnings grew 4.4% from a year earlier, up from 1Q’s 3.4% pace. Meanwhile, the 25th percentile of nominal usual weekly earnings rose 5.5% in 2Q, the strongest four-quarter gain since 4Q22 and accelerating from 1Q’s 2.9% increase. Average hourly and weekly earnings both can obscure economic fundamentals due to compositional changes and other biases. The Employment Cost Index (ECI) for all private workers, which controls for these biases and includes benefits, rose 3.3% over the year ending in June 2026. Labor force participation eased slightly in 2Q26, reflecting demographic pressures and immigration enforcement. The overall LFPR eased to an average of 61.7% in 2Q26, following a decline to 62.0% in 1Q26. Although the LFPR among prime-age workers ticked down somewhat in 2Q26 to 83.7%, it remained 0.6 percentage points above the previous business cycle peak in January 2020. Participation remains particularly resilient among prime-age men: the LFPR for this group has averaged 89.6% in each of the past three quarters. Another measure of labor demand turned up in 2Q26 after declining throughout 2025. After stabilizing around 6.9 million per month in 4Q25 and 1Q26, average monthly job openings increased to 7.6 million in April and May (latest data available). In addition, the ratio of job openings improved for the second consecutive quarter, rising to an average of 1.0 per month in 2Q26. Other indicators reflect labor markets’ ongoing health and stability: the layoffs rate remains stable and near historical lows, initial unemployment claims remain exceptionally low by historical standards, and the hires rate has remained stable for the past 2½ years. Inflation Headline CPI inflationary pressures eased considerably in 2Q26. Average monthly inflation for the second quarter decelerated: average headline inflation was 0.2% per month in 2Q26, down from 0.4% in 1Q26 (see Table 3 – Inflation Indicators). In June 2026, the headline consumer price index (CPI) fell by 0.4% from its level in May. Twelve-month headline CPI inflation was 3.5%, up from the 2.7% annual rate through June 2025, due mostly to hostilities with Iran. Energy price inflation slowed dramatically in 2Q26. After the initial conflict-related price jump in March, energy prices rose at a slower pace in April and May and retreated in June, following the ceasefire with Iran. As a result, CPI inflation for energy goods and services slowed sharply, averaging 0.6% per month in 2Q26, following a monthly average of 3.2% in 1Q26. Food price inflation was relatively stable in 2Q26, ticking up to a monthly average of 0.3% from 1Q26. On a twelve-month basis food price inflation was stable at 3.0% through June 2026, matching the year-earlier rate. The stability of the recent twelve-month rates reflects some easing of energy inputs for food production. Annual inflation in the food at home category was 2.7% in June – and has declined slightly in the past two months. As of June 2026, twelve-month core CPI inflation, which excludes the volatile components of food and energy, was 2.6%, slowing from the 2.9% rate over the year through June 2025. On a monthly average basis, core inflation was 0.2% per month in the first and second quarters. Monthly core goods prices were 0.1% lower on an average basis in 2Q26, after edging up by 0.1% on average per month in 1Q26. On a twelve-month basis, core goods inflation was 0.8% through June 2026, the slowest rate since June 2025. Inflation for rent of housing services (rent of primary residence and owners’ equivalent rent) has eased since 2024. Although rent of housing inflation accelerated to an average of 0.4% per month in 2Q26, this reflected a one-time adjustment to account for inadequate data during the October 2025 federal government shutdown. Rent of housing inflation was 3.2% over the year through June, below the pre-pandemic average of 3.3%. Inflation for non-housing core services slowed by half in 2Q26, averaging 0.2% per month, after averaging 0.4% per month in the previous quarter. Over the year through June 2026, non-housing core services inflation was 3.2%, up slightly from the 3.0%, year-earlier rate. Inflation as measured by the PCE price index has notable differences in weights and methodologies versus the CPI. Over the past 20 years, twelve-month CPI inflation has exceeded PCE inflation by about 0.35 percentage points on average. Over the year through June 2026, the headline PCE price index was 3.7%, 1.1 percentage points above the 2.6% pace over the year through June 2025—though fluctuations in energy prices earlier in the second quarter were a large contributor to the PCE inflation pickup. The Federal Reserve’s target for headline PCE inflation is 2%. Risks to the Outlook We highlight some of the medium-run risks to the outlook below. Looking ahead to the next few quarters, the outlook for the U.S. economy is favorable. On balance, economists view the risk of a recession as relatively low. According to The Wall Street Journal’s survey of economists in July, the average probability of a recession in the next twelve months was just 25%, down from 33% in the April survey. The survey also indicated an improved near-term outlook: projected real GDP growth in 2026 was revised higher, as was average payroll growth over the next four quarters. In addition, respondents expected a lower unemployment rate in December 2026. On the other hand, respondents also projected higher and more persistent inflation, leading them to project higher interest rates than in the April survey. Energy prices and geopolitical uncertainty: Geopolitical uncertainty remains a risk to the medium-term inflation outlook. Energy prices are one of the most volatile categories of inflation. Indeed, monthly energy prices rose 3.8% in April and 3.9% in May before falling 5.7% in June. The timing, duration, and magnitude of energy price swings adds upside risk to inflation for other consumer goods and services – such as food (through fertilizer and fuel for farming equipment) and airfares – adding uncertainty to the medium-run inflation outlook. Importantly, the Trump Administration’s policies have made the U.S. economy more resilient to fluctuations in global oil prices. This resilience is due to a wide range of policies enacted, including deregulatory actions that have increased production and exports of oil and gas, and strategic actions abroad that have resulted in increased demand for U.S. crude and increased supply to the U.S. outside of the Middle East. Average domestic crude oil production in 2025 rose by 350,000 barrels per day relative to the 2024 average. Production and exports have further risen in 2026 as U.S. producers continue to build out U.S. infrastructure. The United States is increasingly the world’s largest producer of petroleum products and natural gas, and it is a net exporter of both. Labor markets: While labor markets are in balance, labor data indicate an environment of less job turnover than in the past, which could leave the economy with less slack to absorb a negative shock. For the past two years, the median private-sector hires rate has been 3.6%. By contrast, layoffs and discharges rates for the private sector have remained near historical lows, with the layoffs rate at just 1.1% in June. The lower turnover environment, while indicating that labor markets are in balance, also suggests a large shock could shift markets out of balance as hiring may not be able to offset an increase in the layoffs and discharges rates. Business fixed investment and the manufacturing outlook: Recent data suggest that the economy is in the early stages of a policy-driven capital expenditures boom. Since the passage of the Administration’s signature tax bill (the Working Family Tax Cuts), fixed business investment has risen by a combined 6.1% through 2Q26, suggesting that provisions in the tax law – such as full expensing of research and development, 100% bonus depreciation for business equipment investments, and restoring deductibility of interest expenses for capital-intensive manufacturers – have been contributing to robust business investment. Indeed, business equipment investment alone has added 0.5 percentage points to GDP growth over the past four quarters, as has spending on intellectual property products. This capital expenditures boom bodes well for future economic growth. Capital investment is correlated with productivity growth, which is a strategic pillar of the Administration’s economic agenda: productivity growth helps drive stronger economic growth and, as a positive supply side development, is usually disinflationary. Over the year ending in 1Q26, real output rose 3.2% while nonfarm business sector productivity increased 2.8%. (Data for 2Q26 will be released Thursday, August 6.) Consistent with these encouraging indicators, shipments and new orders of core capital goods just hit all-time highs. The tax law also included a temporary provision for full depreciation deduction for the costs of new, nonresidential manufacturing facilities. Although real investment in factories and manufacturing structures has declined since mid-2024, the outlook for future manufacturing appears favorable. Jobs related to the construction of nonresidential buildings have grown by 85,000 since September 2025, presaging future manufacturing sector growth as new facilities are completed and products are deployed. In addition, firms that manufacture durable goods have increased their payrolls by 43,000 so far this year. Job openings in durable goods manufacturing have grown by 67,000, and layoffs and discharges have fallen by 21,000. Future business fixed investment – as well as the rates of return on labor and capital that businesses earn from that investment— will continue to serve as key determinants of long-term productivity and economic growth. Artificial intelligence (AI): Investment in artificial intelligence has been a significant driver of economic growth in recent quarters. Throughout 2025, AI-driven investment (BFI in software, computers and hardware, and data center structures relative to pre-LLM trends) accounted for nearly 30% of GDP growth. This trend continued throughout the first two quarters of 2026. Firms’ continued investment in artificial intelligence is likely to lead to efficiency gains, particularly in service-sector industries where productivity growth has been slower. However, the timeline and magnitude of productivity gains is uncertain, as is the ultimate effect on the composition of labor markets. If the integration of artificial intelligence acts as a standard technology improvement, productivity growth could return to historical norms after a period of above-trend growth. On the other hand, artificial intelligence could prove transformational and permanently upshift the path of productivity as it enables workers to build skills and human capital faster than in the past. Artificial intelligence also could have disruptive impacts on the economy and labor markets. Firms that are slow to adapt could find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, as could workers who delay incorporating artificial intelligence to improve their own skills’ growth and productivity. Conclusion The U.S. economy remains resilient, and the outlook is favorable. Robust business investment and steady household consumption growth remain the key drivers of economic growth. Job growth has picked up and the unemployment rate is at or near estimates of full employment. And although inflation has recently shifted, the U.S. economy is resilient to fluctuations in energy prices because of increased oil production, and energy prices should recede following the cessation of conflict in Iran. The Trump Administration has successfully stewarded major fiscal legislation to prevent a historic tax increase. The Council of Economic Advisers has estimated that pro-growth provisions in the law are expected to increase the level real GDP by 4.6-4.9% in the first four years of implementation. Business conditions suggest that now is a good time to expand and invest in America. Investment data bode well for increasing economic growth as the private sector leads. A net 20% of small businesses report plans to make capital outlays, and a net 13% expect the economy to improve – a reading that is higher than any during the Biden Administration. In addition, the Business Roundtable reports that its index of CEO expectations of capital expenditures is now at its highest level since early 2022. Trillions of dollars of investments in U.S. manufacturing, production, and innovation have been announced, reflecting global confidence in the United States as a destination for investment. This capital expenditure boom is made possible by the Administration’s policies allowing full expensing of equipment and R&D, tariffs and reshoring incentives, and deregulation. The combined policies of the Trump Administration, both enacted and planned, provide a solid foundation for economic growth and will bring prosperity to all Americans. ###

TREASURY ANNOUNCES MARKETABLE BORROWING ESTIMATES

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: August 3 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov TREASURY ANNOUNCES MARKETABLE BORROWING ESTIMATES WASHINGTON - - The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced its current estimates of privately-held net marketable borrowing [1] for the July–September 2026 and October–December 2026 quarters. During the July–September 2026 quarter, Treasury expects to borrow $739 billion in privately-held net marketable debt, assuming an end-of-September cash balance of $950 billion. [2] The borrowing estimate is $68 billion higher than announced in May 2026, primarily due to lower projected net cash flows, partially offset by the higher-than-assumed beginning-of-quarter cash balance. Excluding the higher-than-assumed beginning-of-quarter cash balance, the current quarter borrowing estimate is $87 billion higher than announced in May. During the October–December 2026 quarter, Treasury expects to borrow $628 billion in privately-held net marketable debt, assuming an end-of-December cash balance of $850 billion. During the April–June 2026 quarter, Treasury borrowed $190 billion in privately-held net marketable debt and ended the quarter with a cash balance of $919 billion. In May 2026, Treasury estimated borrowing of $189 billion and assumed an end-of-June cash balance of $900 billion. The $1 billion in higher privately-held net marketable borrowing resulted primarily from the higher-than-assumed end-of-quarter cash balance, partially offset by higher net cash flows. Excluding the higher-than-assumed end-of-quarter cash balance, actual borrowing was $18 billion lower than announced in May. Additional financing details relating to Treasury’s Quarterly Refunding will be released at 8:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 5, 2026. ### [1] Privately-held net marketable borrowing excludes rollovers (auction “add-ons”) of Treasury securities held in the SOMA but includes financing required due to SOMA redemptions. Secondary market purchases of Treasury securities by SOMA do not directly change privately-held net marketable borrowing but, all else equal, when the securities mature and assuming the Federal Reserve does not redeem any maturing securities, would increase the amount of cash raised for a given privately-held auction size by increasing the SOMA “add-on” amount. Additionally, buybacks are not expected to significantly affect privately-held net marketable borrowing as new issuance replaces securities that are bought back. 2 Sources and Uses Public Table August 2026 Final.pdf

Treasury Cracks Down on Global Networks Enabling Iran’s Mahan Air and IRGC

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 30, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Cracks Down on Global Networks Enabling Iran’s Mahan Air and IRGC Mahan Air serves as a critical conduit for the IRGC’s movement of weapons, operatives, and military equipment worldwide. WASHINGTON— Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating six entities and individuals in China, India, Russia, and Iran, including multiple companies serving as general sales agents for the U.S.- and European Union‑sanctioned Iranian airline Mahan Air. Although Mahan Air presents itself as a civilian carrier, it has long played a central role in enabling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), providing travel services for IRGC‑Qods Force personnel, facilitating military training, and supporting Iran’s procurement and transport of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems and weapons. “Those who provide financial services, logistics, or commercial support to the IRGC or Mahan Air are helping sustain a terrorist enterprise,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will continue to identify them, expose them, and cut them off from the U.S. financial system.” By sanctioning entities that help sustain Mahan Air’s global operations, today’s action further disrupts the network underpinning Iran’s destabilizing activities across the region. This action advances Treasury’s efforts to intensify economic pressure on the Iranian regime and the IRGC, particularly in response to its reckless attacks against regional states and commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. OFAC is also sanctioning an IRGC‑affiliated front company that has supported Iran’s kinetic targeting during the ongoing conflict. OFAC is taking this action pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups, their supporters, and those who aid acts of terrorism, and in furtherance of the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which directs the U.S. government to deny the IRGC access to assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities. On October 12, 2011 , OFAC designated Mahan Air pursuant to E.O. 13224 for providing financial, material, and technological support to Iran’s IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which OFAC designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2007 for providing material support to multiple terrorist organizations. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC itself pursuant to the counterproliferation authority E.O. 13382 in 2007, and OFAC designated the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13224 in October 2017 for providing support to the IRGC-QF. GENERAL SALES AGENTS SUPPORTING MAHAN AIR While it masquerades as a civilian airline, Mahan Air has provided travel services to IRGC-QF personnel for military training, as well as facilitated Iran’s procurement and transport of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems and weapons to and from Iran. OFAC is taking action today against persons, including general sales agents, providing support to Mahan Air. A general sales agent provides a given airline with sales and customer support services and communicates with freight forwarders and shippers on the airline’s behalf. China-based Shanghai Wings International Logistics Co (Shanghai Wings) is serving as a general sales agent for Mahan Air and has coordinated the transport of electronics from China to Iran. China‑based Tang Xin is the managing director of Shanghai Wings and has coordinated travel for Mahan Air. Tang Xin is the executive director and 50 percent owner of China-based Shanghai Elite International Travel Co (Shanghai Elite), which also represents Mahan Air in China. India-based Skiez Travels and Logistics Private Limited (Skiez Travels) and Russia-based Air Cargo Pro Limited (Air Cargo Pro) also serve as general sales agents for Mahan Air in India and Russia, respectively. Shanghai Wings, Tang Xin, Skiez Travels, and Air Cargo Pro are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mahan Air. Shanghai Elite is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tang Xin. IRGC-AFFILIATED FRONT COMPANY Today, OFAC is also designating DadeNegar Startup Studio (DadeNegar). DadeNegar is a front company affiliated with Iran’s IRGC, supporting military targeting through the use of a website. DadeNegar solicited locations of American and Israeli equipment to support Iranian military targeting. In coordination with the IRGC, DadeNegar received strike requests for U.S. targets in the Middle East. DadeNegar is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of, the IRGC. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

Treasury Disrupts Iranian Regime’s Strait of Hormuz Extortion Network

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 27, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Disrupts Iranian Regime’s Strait of Hormuz Extortion Network OFAC Sanctions Illicit Maritime Insurance Scheme and Iran’s Shadow Fleet WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking further action against the Iranian regime’s desperate efforts to monetize the Strait of Hormuz and prop up the nation’s failing economy. OFAC is designating two firms integral to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-backed extortion scheme that forces commercial vessels to purchase mandatory maritime “insurance” to transit the Strait. Although this coverage purports to protect vessels from risks such as seizures, these risks are overwhelmingly created by Iran itself. Through the Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company and HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority , the regime brokers IRGC-approved policies designed to extract revenue under the guise of maritime services, including payments in digital assets to evade sanctions—allowing Iran to tighten control over shipping activity and funnel funds into IRGC operations. “With its economy in freefall and inflation in the triple digits, the regime is desperate for cash,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The United States will not allow Iran to hold global commerce hostage or use international shipping to finance the IRGC’s terrorism, aggression, and repression.” OFAC is also reinforcing U.S. military interdiction efforts and intensifying pressure on Iran’s energy shipments by imposing sanctions on several vessels that transported Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products. Since the beginning of the year, OFAC has sanctioned over 100 vessels linked to Iran’s shadow fleet, a covert logistics network that enables the regime to keep oil revenues flowing despite international sanctions. Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors and advances the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), to impose maximum economic pressure on Iran . IRANIAN REGIME'S EXTORTION SCHEME In an attempt to prop up revenue streams decimated by Operation Epic Fury, Iran has established illegitimate schemes through the Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company (PGMIC) and HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority , also known as Hormuz Safe, to extort vessels attempting to conduct routine commercial passages through the Strait of Hormuz. Established by the Central Insurance of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran’s primary insurance regulator, the PGMIC brokers and issues insurance policies approved by the U.S.-designated , IRGC-backed Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). The insurance covers risks, most of which are created by Iran itself, such as vessel seizures, and aims to generate revenue to fund the regime’s terror and corruption. PGSA was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on May 27, 2026 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC. Hormuz Safe is an Iranian digital insurance firm that advertises itself as a company offering trusted maritime services, including insurance, traffic control, security, and emergency response, to vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Developed by Iran’s Ministry of Economy, it accepts payment in Bitcoin and other digital assets as part of the regime’s attempts to bypass Western sanctions. Disgraced regime financier Babak Morteza Zanjani , who was sanctioned earlier this year, promoted Hormuz Safe to his social media followers. Hormuz Safe generates revenue on behalf of the IRGC in an attempt to give the regime tighter control over shipping activity. The Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company and HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. SHADOW FLEET ACTORS Treasury is also taking action today against multiple shadow fleet vessels responsible for transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products. Iran’s shadow fleet provides an essential lifeline to the Iranian regime, which relies on oil sales to bolster its ailing economy. The Marshall Islands-flagged chemical/products tanker WELL SAIL (IMO 9321938), owned, operated, and managed by China-based Qi Hang Ship Management Limited , has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian petroleum products to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2026. The Mozambique-flagged crude oil tanker LILY (IMO 9294331), owned and operated by Hong Kong-based Confident Apex Limited , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since 2025. The unknown-flagged crude oil tanker AL SALMI (IMO 9298296), owned and operated by Hong Kong-based Billion Nexus Int’l Co., Limited , has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil to China since 2025. The Barbados-flagged crude oil tanker BREEZE V (IMO 9259355), owned and operated by Hong Kong-based Nevada Spirit Company Limited , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil to China in 2026. The Barbados-flagged crude oil tanker NATSUMI (IMO 9331244), owned, operated, and managed by Hong Kong-based Marinova Freight Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil to China since 2022. The Vanuatu-flagged crude oil tanker CRYSTAL (IMO 9223887), owned, operated, and managed by Hong Kong and Marshall Islands-based Vast Mighty Limited , has transported millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil to China in 2026. The Vanuatu-flagged crude oil tanker NIRETA (IMO 9237785), owned, operated, and managed by Marshall Islands-based Ocean Tranquility Limited , has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian crude oil to China in 2026. The Barbados-flagged crude oil tanker YEHOPE (IMO 9243320), owned by Marshall Islands-based Branch Saying International Trading Co Ltd , has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian crude oil to China in 2026. The following companies are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy: Qi Hang Ship Management Limited; Marinova Freight Limited; Vast Mighty Limited; Ocean Tranquility Limited; Branch Saying International Trading Co Ltd; Confident Apex Limited; Billion Nexus Int’l Co., Limited; and Nevada Spirit Company Limited. The following vessels are being identified as blocked property of the previously identified blocked persons: WELL SAIL (Qi Hang Ship Management Limited); NATSUMI (Marinova Freight Limited); CRYSTAL (Vast Mighty Limited); NIRETA (Ocean Tranquility Limited); YEHOPE (Branch Saying International Trading Co Ltd); LILY (Confident Apex Limited); AL SALMI (Billion Nexus Int’l Co., Limited); and BREEZE V (Nevada Spirit Company Limited). SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked property today . ###

Treasury Unveils Redesigned CFIUS Website

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 29, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Unveils Redesigned CFIUS Website WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury, as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), today launched a dedicated CFIUS website that modernizes how information is organized and introduces new features to help parties better understand and navigate CFIUS processes. The new site improves the accessibility of existing CFIUS content and provides additional resources to the public to support earlier, more effective engagement with CFIUS. “CFIUS plays a critical role in protecting U.S. national security while ensuring the United States remains the world’s most attractive destination for investment,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. “With this new website, the Trump Administration is significantly upgrading CFIUS’s customer service, making it easier for companies, investors, and their counsel to find the information they need, understand our processes, and facilitate greater foreign investment in the United States, consistent with the goals of President Trump’s America First Investment Policy.” The website, accessible at CFIUS.gov , introduces a pre-filing consultations portal that parties can use to ask questions about CFIUS and submit information about their transactions to engage with the Committee early in the process. This tool is intended to help parties better understand CFIUS processes and filing options and to support more efficient reviews. The site also features a new, high-level risk matrix that describes common categories of national security risk that CFIUS identifies in its reviews of foreign investment transactions, along with an illustrative list of sample mitigation measures CFIUS may use to address such risks. New process guidance explains considerations for filing declarations and notices, common sources of CFIUS process delays and best practices to avoid them, frequently requested information not required by CFIUS’s regulations, and recommended approaches for submitting organizational charts. “Today’s launch reflects Treasury’s continued commitment to transparency, accessibility, and operational excellence in investment security,” said Assistant Secretary for Investment Security Chris Pilkerton. “By providing earlier touchpoints with the Committee, clearer guidance on our procedures, and practical examples of risks and mitigation, this website will help parties move more efficiently through the CFIUS process and engage with the Committee early and effectively.” Dedicated pages on the new site provide information about key initiatives of Treasury’s Office of Investment Security (OIS), including the Known Investor Program, the Investment Security Technology Initiative, and the Strategic Vendor Program, and will be updated as these efforts develop. The website also links to OIS’s new presence on X, where stakeholders can receive updates on CFIUS initiatives and other investment security developments. CFIUS is an interagency committee chaired by the Department of the Treasury that reviews certain foreign investment transactions in the United States to assess and address any national security risks arising from such transactions. ###

Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent Before the Financial Literacy and Education Commission

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 27, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent Before the Financial Literacy and Education Commission As prepared for delivery Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us here in the historic Cash Room. And thank you for your ongoing commitment to the work of this Commission as we meet to discuss digital financial literacy following the historic launch of Trump Accounts. I have long believed that the strength of a nation lies as much in the wealth it creates as in the opportunity it extends. That conviction has guided me throughout my career and animated my work as Treasury Secretary. It’s why one of the first actions I took upon entering office was relaunching Financial Literacy Month. And it’s why I am proud to work alongside each of you to help more Americans participate more confidently in our nation’s economic life. Of course, in recent decades, digital platforms and products have redefined how the American people bank, invest, save, spend, and borrow. And the easier it is to participate in our financial system, the more important it becomes to understand how it works. Many consumers, especially younger Americans, are turning to social media, online communities, and AI for financial advice. So today, we will focus on how to help them evaluate this information critically, navigate the digital marketplace safely, and make financial decisions more confidently. By meeting consumers where they are, we can ensure that financial education keeps pace with financial innovation. Trump Accounts demonstrate what this approach looks like in practice. As I mentioned at our previous meeting in February, we have reached a new paradigm in financial education with Trump Accounts because we are going from an abstract notion to a real-time experience. Of course, since then, we have moved from designing this program to implementing it. When the Trump Accounts program went live on July 4th, it became the most successful launch in government history. Today, 7 million children are enrolled, 86 percent of whom are from families earning less than $200,000. Every child born during the President’s term can get a stake in the American Dream from day one with a $1,000 seed investment from the U.S. Treasury. And all U.S. citizens under eighteen are eligible to start saving immediately with these tax-advantaged investment accounts. Now, the opportunity before us is historic because the unfinished work of building an ownership economy has seldom been more apparent. Today, 38 percent of households in this country have no exposure to our great equity markets, while approximately two-thirds of Gen Z Americans fail to answer more than half of basic financial literacy questions. We can move those figures toward zero by creating a new class of shareholders. Trump Accounts will unleash a financial literacy boom. The daily movements of the market will now be personally meaningful to millions. American families, left on the sidelines of Wall Street for too long, will finally understand what a piece of the action feels like. And that experience will be reinforced by fifteen learning modules developed here at Treasury and available on the Trump Accounts app. We’ve tailored these modules to each age group and parents who can participate alongside them. So as we embark on one of the great real-time learning experiences in the history of the United States, I look forward to working with each of you on this Commission to help a new generation enter our economy with both a stake in its future and the knowledge of how to thrive in it. The breadth of representation around this table is a reminder that few priorities bring together as much of the federal government as the work before us today, because the pursuit of financial literacy has never belonged to any one of us, but to all of us. Financial products and services will continue to evolve. Our responsibility across the two dozen federal agencies here today is to ensure that financial education evolves with them. So, thank you to our distinguished panelists for joining us this afternoon and to each of you once again for being here. With that, I’ll turn it over to Mark Paoletta. ###

Treasury Announces Second Round of Sanctions Removals, Updates in Modernization Initiative

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 27, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Announces Second Round of Sanctions Removals, Updates in Modernization Initiative Data-Driven Updates Ensure Sanctions Remain Targeted, Effective, and Current WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took the second major action in its sanctions modernization efforts, announced by Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in May. Today’s action removed 84 individuals and entities and improved identifying information for 22 list entries to facilitate compliance. Those removed from OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) today include individuals and entities no longer considered U.S. national security or foreign policy priorities: some deceased individuals, defunct entities, and targets sanctioned more than 20 years ago, some of whom lack sufficient information for effective compliance screening. As with any removal from its sanctions lists, OFAC conducted appropriate interagency review to ensure that such removal would not harm U.S. foreign policy or national security interests. PRIORITIZING SANCTIONS IMPACT AND SUCCESS As Secretary Bessent has outlined , the goal of Treasury’s sanctions modernization effort is to ensure U.S. sanctions remain targeted, effective, and aligned with U.S. economic, foreign policy, and national security priorities. The Trump Administration is measuring the success of its sanctions in terms of effect, impact, and benefit—not just based on the number of names Treasury places on a list. APPLYING MODERN STANDARDS TO SANCTIONS DATA OFAC’s sanctions review has thus far prioritized scrutiny on older sanctions entries, which sometimes lack identifying information that is now routine for new sanctions actions. While OFAC identified some such entries as appropriate for removal, in some cases, updating list entries by adding identifiers (e.g., place and date of birth, unique identification numbers, nationality, or gender) is more appropriate. With the inclusion of more robust identifying information, compliance-related screening of these names will prove less burdensome for financial institutions. OFAC also identified a small number of duplicate entries on its sanctions lists, where the same person or property was inadvertently included more than once under separate list entries. Today’s action resolves 18 sets of duplicates by removing extra entries and updating relevant identifiers. TREASURY MODERNIZES DELISTING PROCESS WITH RECONSIDERATION PORTAL The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to sanction individuals, entities, and their identified property, but also from its willingness to remove them from OFAC’s sanctions lists, when appropriate and consistent with the law. On June 29, 2026, as part of Treasury’s ongoing sanctions modernization efforts, OFAC launched an online portal that streamlines the process to request removal for persons and property (via authorized representative) added to an OFAC sanctions list. The Reconsideration Portal enables persons and property on an OFAC sanctions list—or their authorized representatives—to submit delisting petitions and request certain information underlying their sanctions determinations. To streamline the petitions process, the portal asks for the key biographic and baseline information required to efficiently adjudicate petitions. It also provides important guidance on how petitioners should organize their submissions as they seek to demonstrate either an insufficient basis for designation or a change in circumstances to satisfy the requirements for removal, as described in 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. For information on the process for seeking removal from an OFAC sanctions list, including the SDN List, please refer to How to Request Removal from an OFAC Sanctions List | Office of Foreign Assets Control . Click here for a complete list of the entries updated or removed from OFAC’s sanctions lists in today’s action . ###

Treasury to Host In-Person Meeting of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 27 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury to Host In-Person Meeting of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission WASHINGTON, D.C. – On Monday, July 27 at 1:00 PM, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent will chair a public meeting of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission (FLEC) . The meeting will focus on digital financial literacy and education. WHO: Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Scott Bessent WHAT: Financial Literacy and Education Commission Public Meeting WHEN: Monday, July 27, 2026, at 1:00 PM ET WHERE: A live webcast of the open session will be available HERE . ###

Joint Statement on the EU-U.S. Joint Financial Regulatory Forum

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 24, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Joint Statement on the EU-U.S. Joint Financial Regulatory Forum Brussels — The EU-U.S. Joint Financial Regulatory Forum took place on 9-10 June 2026 in Brussels, with participants exchanging views on a number of financial regulatory topics of mutual interest. The Forum was co-chaired by the European Commission and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. EU participants included senior representatives of the European Commission, European Central Bank (ECB), European Banking Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and Single Resolution Board (SRB). U.S. participants included senior representatives from the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The Forum highlighted the importance of sustained and close engagement between the EU and the U.S. and discussed: (1) digital finance; (2) market developments and financial stability; (3) the U.S. G20 Presidency’s Finance Track; (4) the EU Savings and Investments Union; (5) bank regulation and supervision, including resolution-related matters; (6) insurance regulation and supervision; (7) capital markets; (8) the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA); and (9) anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Participation varied across themes, with representatives expressing views on issues in their respective areas of responsibility. Participants opened the Forum with an exchange of views on policy priorities in digital finance, including efforts to encourage innovation and developments in relation to tokenisation of securities and the use of tokenised collateral. Participants discussed operational resilience and the use of artificial intelligence in financial services, emphasising both opportunities and importance of identifying and addressing potential risks. EU and U.S. participants provided updates on the state of play of respective regulatory frameworks for digital assets. EU participants updated on the current review of the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation and shared considerations for the ongoing development of the digital euro. And U.S. participants provided an update on progress toward implementing the GENIUS Act, as well as broader U.S. digital asset policy priorities and work. Discussions continued with participants sharing views on financial stability and market developments in their respective areas of authority, noting that the global financial system has been showing resilience in the current environment of financial system potential vulnerabilities, high asset valuations, and uncertain economic outlook. Participants emphasised the importance of robust prudential regulation and continued international dialogue for monitoring vulnerabilities, and of enhancing the resilience of the financial system and its ability to withstand shocks. Participants also discussed recent developments in the private credit market. The U.S. Treasury provided an update on the work of the U.S. G20 Finance Track and advancing priority financial sector issues toward concrete deliverables, and thanked EU participants for their support to the G20 agenda and work of the Financial Stability Board. EU participants updated on progress of the EU Savings and Investments Union strategy, highlighting initiatives to strengthen market integration and supervision and boost the competitiveness of the EU economy, in line with the commitments in the Joint Roadmap agreed by the European Parliament, Council of the European Union, and European Commission to achieving One Europe, One Market. EU and U.S. participants discussed bank regulatory capital requirements, sharing updates on their respective proposals and regulations, including those implementing the final components of Basel III. Participants highlighted the importance of strong and effective prudential regulation and supervision to enhance financial stability and promote a level playing field across jurisdictions, while also stressing the need to avoid unduly burdensome requirements. EU participants provided an update on its work on the forthcoming 2026 report on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector. The discussion then turned to bank resolution, in particular recent U.S. resolution-related initiatives and a recent analysis by the FDIC of deposit runs from March 2023. With respect to the interactions between U.S. federal securities laws and EU open bank bail-in mechanisms, the EU welcomed the SEC’s commitment to prepare a rulemaking recommendation regarding a potential exemption from the Securities Act’s registration requirements for securities offered and sold in connection with a regulatory bail-in. Participants also exchanged views on insurance-related matters, continuing prior discussions on a variety of insurance-related topics, and exchanging views on developments in the life-insurance sector and retirement income protection gaps. U.S. participants asked about the capital treatment of GNMA securities under EU insurance regulation. Participants then discussed capital markets developments, outlining recent work and sharing perspectives on how to increase the attractiveness of public markets as well as increase retail participation in private markets while ensuring that investor protections are in place. In this regard, the SEC participants provided an update on recent proposals to update the SEC’s corporate reporting framework, including rules to enhance and simplify the registration and reporting framework for smaller public companies. Participants also exchanged views on climate disclosures and other corporate sustainability related matters. Participants then discussed financial markets infrastructure developments, with EU participants providing updates on work to shorten the settlement cycle in the EU and in relation to the equivalence framework under the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR), and the SEC on their rules on clearing of U.S. Treasuries. Finally, participants discussed possible reforms to the international accounting and audit standard setting framework with respect to funding and governance. U.S. participants then provided an update on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Regarding countering terrorist financing and anti-money laundering efforts, EU participants shared updates in relation to the implementation of the EU Anti-Money Laundering Package and the operationalisation of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), and U.S. participants provided an update on Treasury’s ongoing efforts to modernize the Bank Secrecy Act. Participants acknowledged the importance of the Forum in facilitating continuous dialogue between the United States and the European Union on financial regulation. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of regular communication on regulatory and supervisory issues of mutual concern to identify potential implications of policies and laws in each other’s jurisdictions, including extraterritorial concerns, and to support financial stability, investor protection, market integrity, and a level playing field. Participants will continue to engage on these topics in the lead-up to the next Forum, expected to take place late 2026. ###

Treasury Further Dismantles Iranian Financier Zanjani’s Network

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 24, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Further Dismantles Iranian Financier Zanjani’s Network WASHINGTON —Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated four individuals and nine entities that form key components of Babak Zanjani (Zanjani)’s broader Iranian sanctions evasion network. Zanjani has leveraged a diverse portfolio—including financial services, gold and precious gem production, digital asset trading, and major transportation and infrastructure projects—to obscure ownership, launder revenue, and expand his capacity to move funds covertly through Iran and offshore. “The Iranian regime continues to pay a steep economic price for its reckless behavior, with the rial plunging to another record low and inflation up massively,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Under President Trump’s leadership, Treasury will continue cutting off economic access for corrupt Iranian regime elites, along with their financiers and facilitators.” Today’s action targets Zanjani’s Iran-based operations under the “Dot One” conglomerate and a series of companies outside Iran that have supported his flagship OFAC-designated digital asset exchanges—Zedcex Exchange Limited (Zedcex) and Zedxion Exchange Limited (Zedxion)—as well as their respective managers and executives. On January 30, 2026 , OFAC designated Zanjani and his two largest digital asset projects, Zedcex and Zedxion. After being sentenced to death in Iran in 2016 for embezzling millions from the OFAC-designated National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), his sentence was commuted in 2024. By 2025, he had publicly re-emerged as a backer of regime-linked economic projects. Alongside high‑profile infrastructure and transportation ventures, Zanjani built a network of digital asset companies, including Zedcex and Zedxion, used in part to launder money for the OFAC-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Through this combined infrastructure, Zanjani’s enterprises have served as both public‑facing commercial ventures and covert financial platforms enabling sanctions evasion and support to Iranian state‑linked entities. THE DOT ONE CONGLOMERATE Following his commutation, Zanjani re-entered the Iranian public eye through the establishment of his multiple Iran-based “Dot One” projects across a variety of diverse industries. Over the past two years, Zanjani has served as both public-facing chief executive and covert financial backer for these companies. Zanjani has frequently used his social media profiles to promote and celebrate Dot One ventures, including the April 2025 $800 million rail contract Dot One Rail Company secured with the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways. As both Iranian and international press have increasingly scrutinized Zanjani’s role within the Dot One conglomerate, the companies have obfuscated their ties with him. Located in Dot One tower in Tehran, Dot One Value Creation Group ( Dot One Value ) is the primary holding company for the Dot One conglomerate. Dot One Value purports to be involved in services including logistics, telecommunications, aviation, transportation, and digital assets. Zanjani was appointed the CEO of this company as early as 2024 and retains control over Dot One Value. DotOne Gold Company is Zanjani’s gold bar minter, producer, and custodian company. DotOne Gold Company is integral to the operations of Tala Token, an allegedly gold-backed digital asset token. Significant quantities of Tala Token passed through Zedcex infrastructure in early 2025. OFAC is designating DotOne Value and DotOne Gold Company pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Zanjani. The Dot One conglomerate’s railway construction, clearing house service, airline service, and ride-sharing service operations are handled by DotOne Rail Company , DotOne Barter Company , DotOne Airlines Company , and DotOne Trip , respectively. OFAC is designating DotOne Rail Company, DotOne Barter Company, DotOne Airlines Company, and DotOne Trip pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Dot One Value. ZEDCEX AND ZEDXION’S NETWORK OF SUPPORTING ENTITIES On January 30, 2026, OFAC designated Zanjani’s two UK-registered exchanges, Zedcex and Zedxion. Multiple Zedcex and Zedxion-attributed addresses have processed funds on behalf of wallets attributed to the IRGC. Zedcex and Zedxion have relied on companies based in Turkey and the United Arab Emirates for material, technological, and financial support. One of these companies has ties to Zanjani’s sister and his significant other. Istanbul-based Zedpay Finansal Sistem Ve Hizmetleri Anonim Sirketi ( Zedpay ) is a financial technology company that provides digital wallet and global transfer services. Zedpay was directly integrated into Zedxion’s platform, allowing users to utilize their Zedpay digital wallets while trading on Zedxion and providing Zedxion with fiat settlement and cross-border payment capabilities to which it would otherwise not have access. OFAC is designating Zedpay pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Zedxion. Additionally, OFAC is designating Mehdi Rezazadeh , the chairperson of Zedpay, pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Zedpay. Dubai-based Zedx DMCC ( Zedx ) is an entity that has acted on Zedcex’s behalf, including with regard to Zedcex’s exchange wallets. OFAC is designating Zedx pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Zedcex. Additionally, OFAC is designating Sukhrob Oimakhmadov , the manager of Zedx, pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Zedx. Dubai-based BZ Diamond FZCO ( BZ Diamond ) is a dealer of lab-grown and natural diamonds managed by Zanjani’s sister, Bahareh Morteza Zanjani . BZ Diamond has supported Zedxion digital asset projects by promoting Zedxion’s NFT marketplace, offering a BZ Diamond token on the Zedxion blockchain, and conducting multiple transactions with Zedxion and Zedcex wallets, including sending assets to Zedxion. OFAC is designating BZ Diamond pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of Zedxion. Additionally, OFAC is designating Bahareh Morteza Zanjani pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, BZ Diamond. Zanjani’s significant other, Solmaz Bani ( Bani ), has registered websites for Zanjani’s companies. OFAC is designating Bani pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Zanjani. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, a ll property and interests in property of the blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s FAQ 897 here and to submit a request for removal, click here . Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked property today . ###

FinCEN Issues Alert on Fraud Schemes Targeting Federal Student Aid

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 24, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov FinCEN Issues Alert on Fraud Schemes Targeting Federal Student Aid WASHINGTON —Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an Alert urging financial institutions to detect, prevent, and report suspicious activity connected to fraud schemes targeting student aid programs administered by the Federal government. Today’s action is the latest in Treasury’s efforts, led by President Trump and Vice President Vance, to eliminate government benefits fraud. “Every dollar stolen from Federal student aid is a dollar taken from taxpayers and deserving students,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The Trump Administration will not tolerate criminals who exploit government programs for personal gain. Treasury is working with financial institutions and law enforcement to identify these fraud schemes, recover stolen funds, and hold those responsible accountable.” Fraud rings use stolen and fraudulent identities, as well as other tactics, to enroll in educational institutions and unlawfully acquire funds from Federal student aid programs. The schemes not only result in losses to Federal student aid programs, but in some cases, real students face difficulties enrolling in classes because of the number of fraudulently enrolled “students.” Fraudsters Steal Personally Identifiable Information to Create “Ghost Students” To create ghost students, fraudsters may illegally obtain Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to impersonate an identity theft victim and pose as a legitimate student. Fraudsters may also use artificial intelligence or other tools to overcome identity verification by generating fraudulent documents that combine stolen PII with fabricated details, commonly referred to as synthetic identities. Victims whose identities are leveraged as part of ghost student schemes, including minors, are unaware that fraudsters are receiving Federal student aid using their PII. Fraud Rings Leverage Complicit “Straw Students” to Obtain Federal Student Aid Straw students are complicit individuals who, for a fee, provide their PII to fraudsters, who then enroll them at educational institutions and collect financial aid refunds issued in their names. Fraudsters may organize sophisticated networks of individual straw students to obtain Federal student aid. Corrupt staff at educational institutions can act as insiders for fraud schemes, taking advantage of their positions to defraud Federal student aid programs by recruiting straw students and manipulating their educational records. Financial Institutions Are Encouraged to Identify and Report Suspicious Activity Involving Federal Student Aid Fraud Financial institutions may be able to identify student aid refund payments either through deposits made directly by educational institutions or by contracted intermediaries. According to Bank Secrecy Act data, payments made by an intermediary typically occur via Automated Clearing House transfers and the associated transaction references may include the term “refund” and the educational institution’s name or abbreviation ( g. , “Local Community College Refund” or “LCC REFUND”). In some cases, the stated recipient may also be listed in the transaction reference ( g. , “LCC REFUND John Doe”). After illicitly obtaining student aid refunds, fraudsters may launder student aid funds, including through money mules, shell companies, and fraudulent accounts. Under President Trump’s leadership, Treasury is committed to eliminating government benefits fraud. Today’s Alert aims to defend the United States against financial fraud and improper payments, an object ive of Executive Order 14249, Protecting America’s Bank Account Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse . ###

Treasury Releases Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Rel ease: July 23, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Releases Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury delivered its semiannual Report to Congress on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United States. In this Report, Treasury reviewed and assessed the policies of major U.S. trading partners, comprising nearly 80 percent of U.S. foreign trade in goods and services, during the four quarters through December 2025. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent remarked: “For decades, unfair currency practices abroad have contributed to the U.S. trade deficit and the hollowing out of U.S. manufacturing employment. When a trading partner engages excessively in foreign exchange market interventions or other actions to artificially lower the value or suppress appreciation of its currency, it imposes significant hardship on American workers and companies for its own gain. In support of President Trump’s America First Trade Policy, Treasury is committed to aggressively and vigilantly monitoring and combatting unfair currency practices. Treasury continues to assess whether the United States’ trading partners are undertaking foreign exchange intervention and implementing non-market policies and practices to manipulate their currencies for unfair competitive advantage in trade to the detriment of American workers, businesses, and economic strength.” In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Treasury analyzed in this Report the practices of the United States’ major trading partners and concluded that no major U.S. trading partner manipulated the rate of exchange between its currency and the U.S. dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade during the four quarters through December 2025. In this Report, Treasury found that no major trading partner met all three criteria for enhanced analysis under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 during the four quarters ending December 2025. However, ten economies are on Treasury’s “Monitoring List” of major trading partners whose currency practices and macroeconomic policies merit close attention: China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland. All were on the Monitoring List in the January 2026 Report. As noted previously, in support of the America First Trade Policy, Treasury will continue to undertake strengthened analysis of major trading partners, as detailed in the January 2026 Report, and will include a discussion of these issues in its intensified evaluation of economies when noteworthy developments arise. While Treasury has not designated China as a currency manipulator in this Report, China continues to stand out among our major trading partners in its relative lack of transparency around its exchange rate policies and practices. This relative lack of transparency will not preclude Treasury from designating China if available evidence suggests that it is intervening through formal or informal channels to resist RMB appreciation in the future. Today’s Report is submitted to Congress pursuant to Section 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 5305, and Section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 19 U.S.C. § 4421. Find the full report here . ###