Department of the Treasury press releases

Treasury Disrupts Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas Financial Networks

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 23, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Disrupts Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas Financial Networks WASHINGTON – Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a senior Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) official, along with three individuals and three entities that have provided material support to Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Two of the designated entities are sham charities tied to the Muslim Brotherhood that funneled substantial funding to Hamas’s military wing, even as the terrorist organization continues to obstruct a peaceful resolution in Gaza. “The Trump Administration will relentlessly pursue terrorists and those who finance them,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Whether operating under the guise of charities, businesses, or underground financial networks, those who enable Hamas will be exposed, sanctioned, and held accountable.” Today’s action further exposes a multi‑layered typology in which Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and Hamas‑directed front organizations operate transnational fundraising channels, using charitable facades and underground banking networks to move and disguise funds across jurisdictions. Today’s sanctions build on OFAC’s prior actions against Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood —including measures announced on March 12, 2026 and January 21, 2026 —targeting Hamas’s global network of financial facilitators, operatives, and sham charities that support its terrorist activities. Today’s action also reflects close coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Customs and Border Protection, whose contributions helped illuminate key nodes of Hamas’s clandestine financial infrastructure. Today’s designations were issued pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, the United States’ core counterterrorism sanctions authority. On October 31, 2001, the U.S. Department of State designated Hamas pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having committed, or posing a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals, or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. Hamas is also designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. SENIOR EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OFFICIAL Mahmoud al-Abyari (al-Abyari) is a United Kingdom-based senior leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB), a group that OFAC designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in January 2026. He is the Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood General Secretariat and has a long history of senior leadership roles within the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Abyari also supported the fundraising for U.S.-designated institutions like Filistin Vakfi and Hayat Yolu , which OFAC previously sanctioned for their ties to Hamas, and worked with Muslim Brotherhood groups to support and provide financial assistance to Hamas. Al-Abyari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. HAMAS FUNDRAISING CHARITIES Using the alias Seven Spikes Global, Indonesia-based Tujah Bulah Global was created by Hamas to fundraise and provide revenue for the Hamas military wing. Similarly, the Gaza-based Madad Palestine Charitable Society was also created by Hamas as a front to raise funds for the Hamas military wing. Madad Palestine Charitable Society funds were collected reportedly for the benefit of civilians but were instead knowingly diverted by Hamas for military purposes. Tujah Bulah Global and Madad Palestine Charitable Society are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hamas. HAMAS MONEY EXCHANGE Türkiye-based El-Kahira for General Trading (El-Kahira) has transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars for Hamas. Türkiye-based Khuldun Khamis Zakaria Alden (Alden) is the owner of El-Kahira, while Türkiye-based Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jebouri (Zaid), and Abdullah Issam Ahmad Al-Jebouri (Abdullah) are shareholders of El-Kahira. El-Kahira provided underground banking services, servicing both fiat and cryptocurrencies, to known Sweden-based organized crime groups like Foxtrot Network . Zaid and Abdullah also provided underground banking services for a separate organized criminal group. El-Kahira for General Trading and Khuldun Khamis Zakaria Alden are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hamas. Zaid Issam Ahmed Al-Jebouri and Abdullah Issam Ahmad Al-Jebouri are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, El-Kahira for General Trading. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

Treasury Takes Largest Action Ever Targeting Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 23, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Takes Largest Action Ever Targeting Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion Sanctions Target CJNG’s Leadership, Drug Trafficking Cells, and Illicit Finance Networks Spread Across Mexico WASHINGTON – Today, in a sweeping action to confront narcoterrorism, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned over 50 Mexican individuals and entities linked to the terrorist group Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Today’s action disrupts a wide range of criminal activities benefitting CJNG across multiple Mexican states. Among today’s targets is dual Mexican-U.S. national Juan Carlos Gonzalez (a.k.a. “Pelon”), who became the new leader of the cartel following the recent death of his stepfather, CJNG founder Ruben Oseguera Cervantes, a.k.a. “El Mencho.” “President Trump has made clear that terrorist cartels will be dismantled,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Today's action strikes Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion's leadership, financiers, and criminal networks, denying the cartel the resources it uses to traffic fentanyl, terrorize communities, and threaten American lives.” CJNG, which is based in Mexico but active globally, is a violent cartel and Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that is responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States. CJNG employs sophisticated money laundering methodologies and alternative revenue streams, such as fuel theft and smuggling and timeshare fraud. Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the international proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production, and pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters. In keeping with President Trump’s pledge to eliminate cartels, OFAC has prioritized targeting these and other criminal groups that threaten the welfare of Americans in close coordination with the Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF), taking nearly 30 actions against 250 individuals and entities. OFAC uses a network-based approach to simultaneously disrupt as many different facets of the cartels as possible, from their leadership and key organizational nodes to facilitators and enablers, such as corrupt officials, complicit family members, and ostensibly legitimate front persons. Today’s action reflects the significance of multiple coordinated HSTF investigations involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other agencies. This unified, whole-of-government approach ensures operational coordination to maximize the impact against transnational criminal networks. Additionally, OFAC coordinated this action with the Government of Mexico’s financial intelligence unit, the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera. CJNG HISTORY Since its formation about 15 years ago, CJNG has become one of the most powerful cartels in the world, achieving this status through violence and corruption. CJNG has intimidated other criminal groups and innocent civilians through horrific attacks, including assassinations of government officials and rivals, while also engaging in widespread bribery of Mexican officials. These acts are perpetrated in furtherance of CJNG’s pursuit of illicit proceeds generated from drug trafficking and other criminal activities, such as fuel theft and timeshare fraud . On April 8, 2015 , OFAC designated CJNG and its founder —El Mencho— pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) for playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking; on December 15, 2021 , OFAC also designated CJNG and El Mencho pursuant to E.O. 14059. On February 20, 2025 , the U.S. Department of State designated CJNG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. On June 18, 2025 , OFAC designated El Mencho pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended. Since April 2015, OFAC has designated over 250 individuals and entities linked to CJNG. The individuals targeted in OFAC’s designation actions against CJNG have included senior cartel operatives, complicit family members, front persons, attorneys, accountants, and corrupt officials. The entities targeted have included resorts, shopping centers, real estate companies, restaurants, agricultural companies, and shell companies. CURRENT CJNG LEADERSHIP Juan Carlos Gonzalez (a.k.a. “Pelon”) is the new leader of CJNG. A longtime cartel member, Pelon rose to this position following the death of his stepfather, El Mencho, who was killed during a Mexican government operation in February 2026. Pelon, who is also known as “Juan Carlos Valencia Gonzalez,” is charged in a U.S. federal drug trafficking indictment, which was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The U.S. State Department, pursuant to its Narcotics Reward Program , is offering up to $5 million for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction. Prior to his current position, Pelon led an armed wing of CJNG that engaged in significant violence. OFAC has previously designated other individuals who collectively form CJNG’s leadership pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended. On June 18, 2025 , OFAC re-designated Audias Flores Silva (a.k.a. “Jardinero”), Gonzalo Mendoza Gaytan (a.k.a. “El Sapo”), and Julio Alberto Castillo Rodriguez. Additionally, on August 13, 2025 , OFAC re-designated Julio Cesar Montero Pinzon (a.k.a. “El Tarjetas”), Carlos Andres Rivera Varela (a.k.a. “La Firma”), and Francisco Javier Gudino Haro (a.k.a. “La Gallina”). FAMILY-FOCUSED CJNG NETWORKS Today’s action highlights how leaders and high-level members of Mexican cartels frequently entrust their assets to close family members and trusted associates. These individuals often maintain leadership roles in companies within their network, in an effort to reduce the risk that the subject companies and those involved will themselves become the subject of future scrutiny. Network of OFAC-Designated Jardinero Mexican authorities arrested Jardinero on April 27, 2026; however, his network survives and continues to operate. In recent years, Jardinero has maintained control of substantial territory within the Mexican states of Jalisco, Nayarit, Michoacan, Guerrero, and Zacatecas. He has amassed a vast network of subordinates including complicit family members, plaza bosses, and financial and logistical associates in various territories. One of the most important associates of Jardinero is CJNG member Cesar Alejandro Villasenor Olivares (a.k.a. “El Guero Conta”), who was also arrested by Mexican authorities in April 2026. El Guero Conta is responsible for overseeing Jardinero’s network—composed of front companies and individuals, and family members—designed to conceal Jardinero’s interest in assets initially obtained with illicit proceeds. Jardinero maintains control of a gas station company, Petrocoda S . A . de C . V ., through his cousin Areli Isis Medina Flores (Medina Flores) and subordinate Gabriel Serrano Magana . Jardinero’s wife Karely Lizbeth Ramirez Banales (Ramirez Banales) owns a beverage store, El Almacen Licoreria . Ramirez Banales and Medina Flores own a wholesale clothing company, Stella Servicios Comerciales Y Empresariales S . A . de C . V . Jose Guadalupe Ruiz Banuelos (a.k.a. “Venado”) is a trusted pilot of Jardinero, who has utilized clandestine landing strips across Nayarit. Plaza bosses subordinate to Jardinero include Jose Octaviano Garcia Martinez (Garcia Martinez), Cuauhtemoc Rivera Zepeda , and Uriel Hernandez Morales . Garcia Martinez is CJNG plaza boss for Florencia, Zacatecas. These plaza bosses produce large quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine in clandestine laboratories in Jalisco and Zacatecas, and operate extensive distribution networks transporting narcotics to U.S. cities. Additional CJNG associates of Jardinero designated today include: Joana Dominguez Aguilera , CJNG member; Roberto Jimenez Arias (Jimenez), CJNG member; Martha Alicia Alvarado Rodriguez (Alvarado), CJNG member and wife of Jimenez; Efrain Corona Pimentel , CJNG member; Angel Gabriel Lopez Larios , CJNG member; Jose Jesus Gutierrez Valdez (Gutierrez Valdez), oversees several methamphetamine laboratories in Zacatecas; and Fidel Damian Moreno Lopez , CJNG member. Several of these individuals also operate businesses based in Mexico: Jimenez operates a beverage crop production company, Casa Tequilera El Origen Del Tequila S . A . de C . V ., and a construction company, Hurrari Kash S . A . Promotora de Inversion de C . V .; Alvarado and Jimenez jointly control a crop production company, Agropecuaria Amateq Del Valle S . A . de C . V .; and Gutierrez Valdez controls a furniture company, Productores Vagu S . A . de C . V . Network of CJNG Senior Member, “El Cachas” Mexico-based Gerardo Botello Rozalez (a.k.a. “El Cachas”) is a senior member of CJNG with long-standing ties to the organization. El Cachas was arrested in 2018 by the Government of Mexico when he was serving as the bodyguard of the wife of CJNG’s long-standing leader. While previously in Mexican custody, he was publicly linked to the sexual abuse of female prison guards. Prior to, during, and following his imprisonment in 2018 in Jalisco, Mexico, El Cachas oversaw CJNG operations across various Mexican territories. Most recently, El Cachas was linked to the Izaguirre Ranch training center, where CJNG recruited members to their criminal organization through heinous and coercive means. El Cachas’ criminal activities have also included huachicol , or fuel theft. In recent years, El Cachas and his nephews, Gustavo Botello Rodriguez (Gustavo Botello) and Wiliams Geovanni Botello Rodriguez (Wiliams Botello), have operated a CJNG cell. In September 2025, Gustavo Botello was arrested by the Government of Mexico on drug trafficking charges. El Cachas is a registered owner of Bubux Baby Shoes S . A . de C . V . (Bubux), which purports to sell baby shoes. El Cachas’ cousin, Miguel Angel Ayala Botello (Miguel Botello), has a leadership role in Bubux and additional entities linked to family members of El Cachas. During a period in which El Cachas oversaw CJNG operations in the Mexican state of Michoacan, Miguel Botello was the Director of the Public Safety Directorate of Tepalcatepec, Michoacan. Furthermore, Gustavo Botello and Wiliams Botello, who as noted above are both CJNG affiliates and family members of El Cachas, became municipal police officers in Tepalcatepec under Miguel Botello. The following companies are all linked to El Cachas or his family members: Green Agropacific S . P . R . de R . L . de C . V . (Green Agropacific) is a Nayarit, Mexico-based beverage crop company; Corporativo de Seguridad Privada Alfa y Gama S . A . de C . V . is a Michoacan- and Jalisco-based private security company that maintains a state-level license to carry firearms; and, Rancho San Miguel Los Tres Hermanos S . P . R . de R . L . de C . V . (Rancho San Miguel) is a Jalisco-based tequila and agave company. In addition, OFAC is also designating El Cachas’s most recent spouse, Liliana Cisneros Tapia , and sons— Jesus David Botello Ortiz , Edgar Gerardo Botello Ortiz , and Ricardo Botello Ortiz —for their roles in the aforementioned corporate entities. Liliana Cisneros Tapia is the Secretary of Green Agropacific’s oversight body, and Jesus David Botello Ortiz and Edgar Gerardo Botello Ortiz serve as the Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Directors of Green Agropacific, respectively. These four individuals are each partial owners of Green Agropacific. In addition, Ricardo Botello Ortiz is the Treasurer of the Board of Directors of Rancho San Miguel. CJNG FENTANYL TRAFFICKING AND FUEL THEFT Just as CJNG itself is engaged in various criminal activities, so are its members. Some individuals are simultaneously engaged in fentanyl trafficking activities as well as huachicol —the theft and/or smuggling of fuel and crude oil. As Treasury has previously highlighted through multiple sanctions actions—most recently on June 30, 2026 —CJNG is not only a drug trafficking cartel, but also engages in rampant fuel theft and smuggling schemes that cost Mexican authorities billions of dollars in lost revenue. Mexico-based CJNG operative Feliciano Ledezma Ramirez (a.k.a. “Chano Limones”) traffics fentanyl to the United States, and has also been involved in significant violence in the Nuevo Italia and Mugica areas of Michoacan. Additionally, Alma Laura Mena Alvarado (Mena) and her husband Jose Mora Leon (Mora) own a logistics company engaged in diverting liquid fentanyl to CJNG. Mena is also engaged in extracting and stealing gasoline in an area controlled by CJNG. Mena and Mora also control two companies based in Mexico: Strong Energy S . A . de C . V ., a petroleum and natural gas extraction company, and Transic Logistic S . A . de C . V ., a logistics company. CJNG COCAINE TRAFFICKERS AND ENFORCERS Treasury is also targeting a CJNG-linked cocaine trafficking network led by twin brothers from Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico: Marcial Apolinar Diaz Robles and Pedro Marcial Diaz Robles . The Diaz Robles twins have a very close relationship with several members of CJNG’s inner circle and have used these connections to facilitate large shipments of cocaine and other narcotics from South America to Mexico, and eventually onward to the United States and Europe. Jorge Zepeda Rodriguez (Zepeda), a Guadalajara-based businessman, money launderer, and cocaine broker, was heavily involved in the Diaz Robles twins’ drug trafficking operations. Zepeda paid the Diaz Robles twins millions of dollars for access and connections to various ports in Mexico to further his own drug trafficking interests, and he has worked with the twins to smuggle cocaine to the United States and globally. Mexico-based senior CJNG narcotics traffickers and enforcement members include Rodolfo Alejandro Loza Garcia (a.k.a. “El 26”), who is engaged in significant violence on behalf of CJNG in northern Jalisco, and Francisco Noe Gonzalez Ramirez (a.k.a. “El F1”), a high-ranking CJNG member engaged in drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and violence in Zacatecas. THIRD-PARTY MONEY LAUNDERING NETWORK As one of the world’s largest drug cartels, CJNG requires a robust network of financiers, money brokers, and professional money launderers to manage, process, and return the dirty funds from the cartel’s various revenue streams to its leadership. One such network of professional cartel money launderers is based in the CJNG-heartland of Zapopan and Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico. This network is comprised of the following individuals: Salvador Israel Rodriguez Flores , Jorge Villa Sanchez , Adolfo Gabriel Medina Chavira , Jorge Fernando Cruz Cabrera , Julio Cesar Castellanos Ceja , Luis Mario Mendoza Garcia , and Hugo Alejandro Sanchez Tamayo . Together, these individuals coordinated the collection of bulk cash narcotics proceeds from multiple cities in the United States, transferred the funds back to Mexico via various financial instruments, and ultimately returned the money to its cartel owners—lining the cartel’s coffers and enriching themselves by taking a percentage of the drug proceeds as a fee in the process. By using this scheme, this network was able to launder tens of millions of dollars per year since at least 2023. The legal bases for sanctions imposed on the aforementioned individuals and entities are listed below: OFAC designated the following individuals pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, CJNG: Juan Carlos Gonzalez (a.k.a. “Pelon”) Cesar Alejandro Villasenor Olivares (a.k.a. “El Guero Conta”) Gabriel Serrano Magana Jose Octaviano Garcia Martinez Cuauhtemoc Rivera Zepeda Uriel Hernandez Morales Joana Dominguez Aguilera Roberto Jimenez Arias Martha Alicia Alvarado Rodriguez Efrain Corona Pimentel Angel Gabriel Lopez Larios Jose Jesus Gutierrez Valdez Fidel Damian Moreno Lopez Gerardo Botello Rozalez (a.k.a. “El Cachas”) Gustavo Botello Rodriguez Wiliams Geovanni Botello Rodriguez Feliciano Ledezma Ramirez (a.k.a. “Chano Limones”) Alma Laura Mena Alvarado Rodolfo Alejandro Loza Garcia (a.k.a. “El 26”) Francisco Noe Gonzalez Ramirez (a.k.a. “El F1”) Marcial Apolinar Diaz Robles Pedro Marcial Diaz Robles OFAC designated the following individuals pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, CJNG. These individuals are also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, CJNG: Jose Mora Leon Salvador Israel Rodriguez Flores Jorge Villa Sanchez Adolfo Gabriel Medina Chavira Jorge Fernando Cruz Cabrera Julio Cesar Castellanos Ceja Luis Mario Mendoza Garcia Hugo Alejandro Sanchez Tamayo OFAC designated Karely Lizbeth Ramirez Banales, and Areli Isis Medina Flores pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Audias Flores Silva. OFAC designated Jose Guadalupe Ruiz Banuelos pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Audias Flores Silva. Ruiz is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Audias Flores Silva. OFAC designated Mexico-based gas company, Petrocoda S . A . de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Audias Flores Silva. OFAC designated Mexico-based wholesale clothing company, Stella Servicios Comerciales Y Empresariales S . A . de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Medina Flores and Ramirez Banales. OFAC designated Mexico-based beverage store, El Almacen Licoreria pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ramirez Banales. OFAC designated Mexico-based beverage crop production company, Casa Tequilera El Origen Del Tequila S . A . de C . V ., and construction company, Hurrari Kash S . A . Promotora de Inversion de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jimenez. OFAC designated Mexico-based crop production company, Agropecuaria Amateq Del Valle S . A . de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jimenez and Alvarado. OFAC designated Mexico-based wood company, Productores Vagu S . A . de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Gutierrez Valdez. OFAC designated Strong Energy S . A . de C . V . and Transic Logistic S . A . de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mena and Mora. OFAC designated Mundo Fit Suplementos S . A . de C . V . and Medin Products pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Adolfo Gabriel Medina Chavira. OFAC designated Jorge Zepeda Rodriguez pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Marcial Apolinar Diaz Robles and Pedro Marcial Diaz Robles. Zepeda is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Marcial Apolinar Diaz Robles and Pedro Marcial Diaz Robles. OFAC designated Optic Private Transportation S . A . de C . V . pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jorge Zepeda Rodriguez. OFAC designated Miguel Botello pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Gerardo Botello Rozalez. Miguel Botello is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Gerardo Botello Rozalez. OFAC designated Liliana Cisneros Tapia, Edgar Gerardo Botello Ortiz, and Jesus David Botello Ortiz pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Green Agropacific S.P.R. de R.L. de C.V. OFAC designated Ricardo Botello Ortiz pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Rancho San Miguel Los Tres Hermanos S.P.R. de R.L. de C.V. OFAC designated Bubux pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Gerardo Botello Rozalez. OFAC designated Green Agropacific; Corporativo de Seguridad Privada Alfa y Gama S.A. de C.V.; and Rancho San Miguel pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Miguel Angel Ayala Botello. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the personsdesignated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . Click here for a chart of CJNG Leadership . Click here for a chart of CJNG-linked networks . ###

Secretary Bessent Delivers Remarks at Wheeler High School in Marietta, Georgia

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 22, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Secretary Bessent Delivers Remarks at Wheeler High School in Marietta, Georgia As prepared for delivery. Good afternoon. What a great day it is to be here in Georgia. And what a welcome we’re about to give to a President who has never stopped fighting for the people of this great state. Now, many of you may think the best part of my job as Treasury Secretary is getting calls from President Trump in the middle of the night. “Scott, I didn’t wake you, did I?” “No, sir. I’m always up at 1:52 am on Tuesdays.” But the best part of my job is the chance to get out of Washington to spend time with the amazing people of these United States. And there are few places where you see the strength and spirit of America more clearly than in Georgia. Georgians don’t believe that the government creates jobs so much as clears the way for the people who do. You believe that prosperity is built from the ground up, not imposed from the top down. And that small businesses build stronger communities than big government ever could. Cobb County, in short, is Trump Country. There’s a reason why President Trump won more votes in Georgia than any other candidate in history. And I am grateful to be with you today to hear directly from him in just a few moments. Now, serving President Trump is the honor of a lifetime. And from my view at Treasury, I can tell you that no one fights harder. No one works longer. And no President has asked more of his team and of himself so that we can restore American strength and reclaim American sovereignty. His record speaks for itself. But let me remind you that President Trump has signed the largest tax cuts in American history. Rebalanced global trade in favor of our working families. Reclaimed our position as the world’s energy superpower. And saved this country by securing its borders. Any one of these wins would be historic on their own. But taken together, they are transformative. Our economy has now averaged over 100,000 good paying private sector jobs per month for the last four months and real GDP growth has increased at a rate of 2.7 percent over the past four quarters. Private sector employment is up more than 900,000 since Inauguration Day. The Working Families Tax Cuts delivered the largest share of tax relief directly to millions of low- and middle- income Americans. Here in Georgia, the Trump tax cuts saved the average family more than $3,100 on their taxes this year and protected over 200,000 jobs. Meanwhile, companies have poured trillions of dollars of new investment into our country. And more Americans are working under President Trump than at any other time in history. But of all this President has achieved, his most enduring legacy may be the reason we are here today. Trump Accounts represent the most successful program launch in government history, with more than 6 million signups before it even went live. Every child born during the President’s term can get a stake in the American Dream from day one with a $1,000 seed investment from the U.S. Treasury. And don’t listen to the Democrats when they claim that this is a program for the rich. Eighty-six percent of enrolled children are from families earning less than $200,000. Trump Accounts are reaching the very people they were designed to serve. Of course, for decades, the federal government demonstrated its ineptitude at building a product that people wanted and delivering it at scale. Obamacare gave us a website that collapsed upon its launch. And Obama’s so-called “myRA” savings accounts are now defunct because they were such an abject failure, although not before costing taxpayers tens of millions. But under President Trump’s leadership, we have designed and built a world-class platform. Trump Accounts enrolled a million children every single month between its announcement and launch. No tech launch in history has seen those numbers. Millions of American youth are now able to watch their investment accounts compound in real time, from a couple thousand dollars in kindergarten to an estimated half a million dollars by the age of retirement. It turns out that the federal government was never incapable of delivering something this ambitious. All we needed was a new president. Now critically, Trump Accounts are no government handout. They are a child’s first claim upon the American Dream at a time when too many are taught to doubt it. Look around our campuses and classrooms today—apart from those here at Wheeler, of course—and you will find that our students are being sold the seductive lie that government can solve every problem, redistribute every dollar, and supplant its judgment for our own. Our children are taught to romanticize an ideology that results in ruin wherever it is tested. To critique capitalism for every one of its flaws and to forgive socialism for every one of its failures. In New York, the current mayor rose to power by repackaging failed ideals of the past as the moral cause of the future. But in Georgia, you know that beneath his youthful veneer lies the oldest impulse in politics, which is to concentrate power and then call it compassion. Show me some place where this has ever worked. Moscow? Caracas? Havana? These workers’ paradises all ended up deprivation hellscapes. So, at their core, Trump Accounts represent the triumph of capitalism over socialism—and how our answer to the next free stuff, big government charlatan is to build an ownership economy. It is to counter the rising tide of freedom-strangling socialism by creating a new generation of shareholders. And it is to remember that the surest defense of a free society is the citizen who owns a greater share of it. So, the full reach of this presidency will ripple across generations thanks to policies like Trump Accounts. But my own sense of his place in history is already clear: Donald J. Trump is the most consequential president of my lifetime. And I know you share my excitement in welcoming him to Georgia today. For everyone in this audience, especially the young people, know that President Trump is creating assets for the American people, not more debt and broken promises. So, thank you once again to the families of Wheeler High School for receiving us so warmly. To the great people of Cobb County for being here. To President Trump for affirming that the American Dream belongs to every child—and for equipping the next generation to claim its rightful share of it. Thank you. ###

READOUT: Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent's Meeting with Pakistan's Federal Minister for Finance and Revenue Muhammad Aurangzeb

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 22, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov READOUT: Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent's Meeting with Pakistan's Federal Minister for Finance and Revenue Muhammad Aurangzeb WASHINGTON — Yesterday, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent met with Pakistan's Federal Minister for Finance and Revenue Muhammad Aurangzeb. Secretary Bessent welcomed the progress Pakistan has made in restoring macroeconomic stability and advancing fiscal consolidation, recognizing the government's efforts to implement significant economic reforms. The Secretary emphasized the importance of sustaining the momentum of Pakistan's reform agenda to promote durable economic growth and strengthen the country's long-term economic resilience. Secretary Bessent expressed support for Pakistan's efforts to build greater economic self-reliance and commended the government's commitment to creating the conditions for a successful return to international capital markets.

Treasury Successfully Implements New Safeguard to Stop Payments to Deceased Individuals

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 21, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Successfully Implements New Safeguard to Stop Payments to Deceased Individuals New Verification Process Screened Over 885 Million Federal Payments Worth Nearly $2.7 Trillion WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Fiscal Service announced the successful implementation of a new government-wide payment verification process that helps stop federal payments from being sent to deceased individuals, fulfilling a key requirement of Executive Order 14249 , Protecting America's Bank Account Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. “Treasury has delivered on a key promise of President Trump’s mandate to stop improper payments and fraud before money leaves the Treasury, and strengthen the integrity of the federal payment system,” said Secretary Scott Bessent . “Together with Vice President Vance’s Task Force to Eliminate Fraud, this new safeguard addresses a longstanding vulnerability and helps ensure every dollar the federal government spends reaches its intended recipient. Treasury will continue efforts to modernize the federal payment system, strengthen safeguards against fraud and improper payments, and protect taxpayer dollars.” BACKGROUND Since President Trump issued Executive Order 14249 , Protecting America's Bank Account Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse , on March 25, 2025, Treasury has significantly expanded government-wide efforts to detect and prevent fraud and improper payments through the Do Not Pay program and new payment verification tools. To date, Treasury has screened over 885 million payments totaling approximately $2.77 trillion as part of the new payment verification process. The screening has identified more than 4,900 payments worth approximately $99 million that were associated with deceased payees . Those payments were returned to the originating federal agencies for review before any funds were disbursed. The new screening capability builds on Treasury's recent expanded access to the Social Security Administration's Full Death Master File, enabling more comprehensive identification of deceased payees before payments are issued. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 granted Treasury temporary access to the data for a three-year pilot program. During the pilot's first year, Treasury significantly expanded its ability to identify deceased payees and projected an estimated $330 million in net benefits between 2024 and 2026 through reduced improper payments. In February 2026, Congress passed, and President Trump signed, the Ending Improper Payments to Deceased People Act , providing Treasury with permanent access to the Full Death Master File and allowing these payment integrity efforts to continue on a permanent basis. Treasury will continue implementing the payment verification capabilities required under the Executive Order to further strengthen safeguards against fraud, waste, and improper payments across the federal government. ###

Secretary Bessent Delivers Remarks Before the Ministerial on the Resurgence of Political Terrorism

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 16, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Secretary Bessent Delivers Remarks Before the Ministerial on the Resurgence of Political Terrorism As prepared for delivery. Good morning. Thank you, Secretary Rubio, for convening this ministerial and for the invitation to be here. We are here together because the resurgence of political terrorism, transnational in design and far-left in doctrine, is no longer the concern of any one nation. It demands a response that draws upon the distinct and combined strengths of every government represented here today. Ours begins where every campaign of terror does: its financial lifeblood. And at President Trump’s direction, the United States Treasury is bringing the full weight of our authorities to defend the integrity of the U.S. and global financial systems. More than twenty years ago, in the wake of 9/11, Treasury became the first finance ministry in the world to establish an office dedicated to disrupting the funding networks of terrorist organizations. Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, referred to as TFI, was created in recognition of the reality that America’s financial system is essential to its national security. TFI’s mandate to identify, disrupt, and disable illicit foreign funds that threaten our homeland has become one of the Treasury’s defining responsibilities. And today, we are extending that abiding mission to meet an evolving threat. The resurgence of organized political terrorism has long occupied a blind spot. The international community has struggled to identify this danger, much less to defeat it. But as the threat of terrorism evolves, the institutions and tools that defend against it must adapt. We once understood terrorism principally as an external menace. That is no longer the world we inhabit. Increasingly, we are confronting sophisticated, organized networks that cross borders to incite violence within them. Meanwhile, old ideological boundaries are now giving way to new operational alliances. The unified front between international Marxism and the radical Islamic movement need not share the same ultimate vision to share the same immediate enemy of free and self-governing societies. That convergence should concern every government represented in this room. These terrorists understand an enduring truth: societies are rarely subverted from afar until they have first been weakened from within. So as it tears at the social fabric that allows our societies to function, left-wing terrorism is the visible manifestation of a much broader and more insidious effort to undermine the philosophies that built Western civilization and sustain all we hold dear. Some of these activities are overt: bombings, assassinations, and organized violence in our streets. Others are quieter campaigns to suppress speech, intimidate political opposition, and sabotage our national institutions. Of course, whatever form they take, none of these attacks sustain themselves. Violence requires money, channels through which funding can move, and institutions behind which it can hide. Increasingly, legitimate nonprofit and charitable structures are being exploited as a mechanism to conceal the movement of illicit funds to support political terrorism. For Treasury, the application of our authorities to combat these networks represents the natural evolution of our mission. Through our Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and IRS-CI we have spent decades developing the world’s most sophisticated financial counterterrorism capabilities. And we are now mobilizing some of the same tools that we have deployed against terrorists abroad to confront this emerging threat here in the homeland. Like every form of illicit finance, these networks rely on the global financial system. It is our mandate to deny terrorist groups access to those channels. Now, we think of nonprofits and charities as good, altruistic organizations. Most of them are. We think that they represent the very best of civil society. Many of them do. But the very qualities that make these institutions worthy of the public’s trust can also make them appealing to those who endeavor to exploit it. At President Trump’s direction, Treasury is expanding its efforts to identify organizations that abuse charitable and nonprofit structures as vehicles for illicit finance. We are examining where tax-exempt status has been exploited, which charitable entities have become financial conduits for foreign-influence activity, and how those entrusted with stewardship of these organizations have instead enabled violence. Where the evidence leads, we will not hesitate to follow. And, of course, we will hold these organizations’ officers and directors accountable, just as financial institutions must know theirs. That work is well underway. In the fall, the United States designated four far-left Antifa extremist groups abroad as foreign terrorist organizations, denying them access to the U.S. financial system and depriving them of resources they need to carry out attacks. Meanwhile, in this Administration alone, OFAC has also sanctioned seventeen sham charities and non-profit organizations for funding Hamas’s terrorist activities and operations. As Treasury continues to map and disrupt the flow of funding that enables these entities to operate, no terror organization should delude itself into the belief that its financing lies beyond our reach. No facilitator should assume that anonymity confers impunity. And no jurisdiction should expect to enable or harbor these activities without consequence. To be clear, in the fight against domestic terrorism, we must respect the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, association, and assembly of all Americans. As such, it is important to emphasize that Treasury will act based on suspected unlawful conduct by these terror organizations—not because of their beliefs or ideologies. At Treasury, this work is mission critical. But we cannot do it alone. The threat is transnational. Our response must be no less so. Indeed, our cooperation must be as disciplined as the networks we seek to dismantle. The global financial system is one of the great achievements of the modern world. And we must never allow it to become a sanctuary for those who seek to subvert it. So, on behalf of the United States Treasury, let there be no uncertainty about the work before us and the resolve with which we will undertake it. We will identify illicit funding, however artfully it is concealed. We will dismantle the networks that sustain political terrorism, however respectable their fronts. We will pursue those who enable political violence, however distant their jurisdictions. And we will deepen our collaboration with every nation represented in this room, for as long as this work requires. That is our commitment. We ask that you make it yours, too. Secretary Rubio, thank you again for convening us here this morning. Let us work together to translate the spirit of this ministerial into a commitment that endures well beyond it. And let us deny our adversaries the one thing on which they count most: that those of us assembled in this room will grow weary in our cooperation before they do. Thank you. ###

READOUT: Financial Stability Oversight Council Meeting on July 15, 2026

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 15, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov READOUT: Financial Stability Oversight Council Meeting on July 15, 2026 WASHINGTON — Today, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent convened a meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) in executive session at the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). During the executive session, the Council received a briefing from Treasury staff on a recent interagency tabletop exercise on geopolitical risk hosted by Treasury as part of the Council’s work to promote economic security. The Council also received a presentation from Treasury staff on the work of the Council’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Working Group and a briefing on four public-private roundtables co-hosted by the Council and Treasury as part of the AI Innovation Series. These discussions were intended to support the continued strength and resilience of the U.S. financial system in an era of accelerating technological change. The Council then heard a presentation from Treasury staff on the Council’s quarterly financial stability monitor. The presentation described key developments during the second quarter of 2026 in the banking sector, financial markets, household finances, and financial innovation. The presentation also featured discussion of supply chain risks, AI implications for the labor and capital markets, and cybersecurity. In addition, the Council received a presentation from Treasury staff on the public comments received on the Council’s proposed interpretive guidance on nonbank financial company designations. The Council will continue to work toward finalizing the guidance. Finally, the Council heard a presentation from Treasury staff on planning for the Council’s upcoming 2026 annual report. The Council also voted to approve the minutes of its previous meeting on May 6, 2026. In attendance at the Council meeting at Treasury were the following members: Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury (Chairperson of the Council) Kevin Warsh, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Jonathan V. Gould, Comptroller of the Currency Russell Vought, Acting Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission Travis Hill, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Michael S. Selig, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Aaron Kofsky, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Housing Mission and Goals, Federal Housing Finance Agency (acting pursuant to delegated authority) Kyle S. Hauptman, Chairman, National Credit Union Administration Steven Seitz, Director, Federal Insurance Office (non-voting member) Elizabeth K. Dwyer, Director, Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation (non-voting member) Lise Kruse, Commissioner, North Dakota Department of Financial Institutions (non-voting member) Additional information regarding the Council, its work, and the recently approved meeting minutes is available at http://www.fsoc.gov . ###

Treasury Targets Global Network Procuring Weapons for Iranian Regime

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 15, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov READOUT: Financial Stability Oversight Council Meeting on July 15, 2026 WASHINGTON — Today, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent convened a meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) in executive session at the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). During the executive session, the Council received a briefing from Treasury staff on a recent interagency tabletop exercise on geopolitical risk hosted by Treasury as part of the Council’s work to promote economic security. The Council also received a presentation from Treasury staff on the work of the Council’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Working Group and a briefing on four public-private roundtables co-hosted by the Council and Treasury as part of the AI Innovation Series. These discussions were intended to support the continued strength and resilience of the U.S. financial system in an era of accelerating technological change. The Council then heard a presentation from Treasury staff on the Council’s quarterly financial stability monitor. The presentation described key developments during the second quarter of 2026 in the banking sector, financial markets, household finances, and financial innovation. The presentation also featured discussion of supply chain risks, AI implications for the labor and capital markets, and cybersecurity. In addition, the Council received a presentation from Treasury staff on the public comments received on the Council’s proposed interpretive guidance on nonbank financial company designations. The Council will continue to work toward finalizing the guidance. Finally, the Council heard a presentation from Treasury staff on planning for the Council’s upcoming 2026 annual report. The Council also voted to approve the minutes of its previous meeting on May 6, 2026. In attendance at the Council meeting at Treasury were the following members: Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury (Chairperson of the Council) Kevin Warsh, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Jonathan V. Gould, Comptroller of the Currency Russell Vought, Acting Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission Travis Hill, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Michael S. Selig, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Aaron Kofsky, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Housing Mission and Goals, Federal Housing Finance Agency (acting pursuant to delegated authority) Kyle S. Hauptman, Chairman, National Credit Union Administration Steven Seitz, Director, Federal Insurance Office (non-voting member) Elizabeth K. Dwyer, Director, Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation (non-voting member) Lise Kruse, Commissioner, North Dakota Department of Financial Institutions (non-voting member) Additional information regarding the Council, its work, and the recently approved meeting minutes is available at http://www.fsoc.gov . ###

Treasury Targets Global Network Procuring Weapons for Iranian Regime

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 15, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Targets Global Network Procuring Weapons for Iranian Regime WASHINGTON — Today, following Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven individuals and entities involved in an international network supporting weapons procurement efforts on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The actors designated today exemplify Iran’s use of foreign aviation and transport firms, financial conduits, and travel coordinators to obscure the IRGC’s role in illicit procurement and to move material and personnel globally. OFAC will continue to disrupt the overseas procurement and financial networks that sustain Iran’s weapons production and proliferation efforts, which threaten Americans and U.S. partners and allies worldwide. “President Trump has been clear that Iran must denuclearize,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Treasury will continue to target and disrupt the illicit procurement networks that fund Iran’s weapons programs and war machine.” Today’s action builds on OFAC’s May 8, 2026 and June 10, 2026 designations, which targeted, among others, procurement networks that sourced weapons for the IRGC and Iran’s Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation (CITC), including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). OFAC is acting pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators and their supporters. The U.S. Department of State designated the IRGC pursuant to E.O. 13382 in October 2007 in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program, and today’s action advances National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 , which directs the U.S. government to deny the IRGC access to assets and resources that sustain its destabilizing activities. IRGC PROCUREMENT NETWORK Iranian national Behrouz Namazi (Namazi) is the general director of Nika Jet Company , a Tehran-based provider of services for the production, distribution, and maintenance of aircraft parts and drones. Namazi has sought to secure weapons on behalf of the IRGC. Nigeria-based Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited (Vanguard Tactical Supply) is an intermediary for Namazi’s efforts, and Milan-based Italian national Dounia Ettaib (Ettaib) is a witting participant in efforts to procure weapons for Namazi. Russian national Mariya Vladimirovna Selina (Selina) is a longtime procurement agent for Iran. Selina is the head of the financial department at Avratek OOO (Avratek), an aviation transportation company based in Moscow, and has supported Namazi’s procurement efforts on behalf of the IRGC. Russian national Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin (Druzhbin) is also an employee at Avratek and has coordinated travel for Namazi and Selina. Druzhbin has previously been involved in coordinating Iranian shipments. Namazi and Selina are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC. Nika Jet is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by, or acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Namazi. Vanguard Tactical Supply, Ettaib, and Avratek are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or goods or services in support of, Namazi. Druzhbin is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Avratek. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

Treasury Announces Frank Bisignano to Lead Next Phase of Trump Accounts Expansion

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 15, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Announces Frank Bisignano to Lead Next Phase of Trump Accounts Expansion WASHINGTON — Following the historic joint bell-ringing in the Oval Office on July 6, 2026, marking the launch of Trump Accounts, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announces that Frank Bisignano will lead the implementation of the program’s next phase. As Chief Executive Officer of the Internal Revenue Service and Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Mr. Bisignano has been involved in the effort, and his experience will support the program’s implementation and continued growth. Before joining the Trump Administration, he was a veteran financial services chief executive with close to four decades leading large organizations through transformational growth and building high-performing executive teams. Treasury looks forward to onboarding millions more American children into the initiative, building on the strong early participation already underway. Over 6.5 million families have signed up for Trump Accounts, including more than 1.5 million children eligible for the $1,000 pilot contribution from Treasury. ###

Treasury Intensifies Pressure on Shamkhani’s Expansive Illicit Shipping Empire

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 14, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Intensifies Pressure on Shamkhani’s Expansive Illicit Shipping Empire WASHINGTON— Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is intensifying its efforts to disrupt and degrade the illicit shipping and sanctions evasion network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani). This action is part of Treasury’s ongoing efforts to ramp up economic pressure on the Iranian regime after it resumed destabilizing attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. The Shamkhani network remains a major force behind Iran’s oil exports and has expanded into global containerized shipping and commodities trading. “The Iranian regime survives on deception, and the Shamkhani network is one of its most profitable engines,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “Treasury is shutting down the financial infrastructure that allows the regime to continue its threats to U.S. national security and global shipping.” Today’s action includes more than 50 individuals, entities, and vessels that enable Shamkhani and the Iranian regime to continue profiting while the Iranian people remain burdened under the economic yoke imposed by their government. Today’s action builds on OFAC’s April 2026 and July 2025 designation actions targeting the Shamkhani network, and Treasury has now sanctioned more than 200 individuals, entities, and vessels operating under Shamkhani’s patronage. Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which provides authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to identify and impose sanctions on key sectors of Iran’s economy. Today’s action also reflects OFAC’s ongoing close collaboration with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Treasury continues to target Iranian oil sales under the President’s National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2). KEY FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICS ASSOCIATES Iranian nationals Hossein Ghorbani Zahed (Zahed) and Mohammad Reza Rahbar Madani (Madani), both of whom also hold Dominica passports, have worked as primary financiers for Shamkhani’s network, providing it with exchange house services including access to foreign currency and shell companies based outside of Iran. Madani and Zahed are essential for the network’s ability to trade in sanctioned goods and recoup the proceeds. Zahed is the beneficial owner of British Virgin Islands- and Dubai-based Golden Nest Group Ltd , and the director of Dubai-based BSG Management Ltd . Iranian and Russian dual national Ali Rakhbarmadani , one of Shamkhani’s closest business associates, is linked to multiple companies within the network, including sanctioned companies Koban Shipping L.L.C., Crios Shipping L.L.C., and Marvise SMC DMCC. Ali Rakhbarmadani is also the owner of Dubai-based Al Kina Commercial Broker LLC —a company tied to the Shamkhani network—and was the deputy chief executive officer of sanctioned Oriel Group prior to its designation. Ali Rakhbarmadani effectively operated as the head of shipping for Shamkhani, handling much of the network’s communications with customers and partners. Ali Rakhbarmadani encouraged the Russian side of the Shamkhani network’s trade to find ways to avoid the price cap on Russian oil to maximize profits following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Martin Austin Kaalund (Kaalund), a Danish national, and Alessandra Ronco (Ronco), an Italian national, both spent years as executives of sanctioned Shamkhani shipping oversight company House of Shipping Investment FZCO (House of Shipping), most recently as the global chief financial officer and global chief executive officer, respectively. Kaalund and Ronco played key day-to-day and strategic roles in House of Shipping’s operations. Kaalund and Ronco are the co-founders and managers of Dubai-based Evorit Strategy Consulting LLC-FZ . Asghar Aghili Dehkordi , an Iranian national, has also served in a strategy role for multiple Shamkhani network companies, including sanctioned Milavous Group Ltd. Indian national Jijin George (George) and Iranian national Behzad Moghadas are involved in facilitating the operation of vessels within the Shamkhani fleet. George is an employee of sanctioned company Teodor Shipping L.L.C. Gautam Vishavdeep (Vishavdeep), an Indian national, is a manager within the Shamkhani network, facilitating shipments of Iranian oil and coordinating with network partners. British national Maksim Tsernosjov is a senior vessel inspector in Shamkhani’s illicit shipping network. UAE-based Dezera Shipping FZCO provides management services for Shamkhani vessels OPAL (IMO 9467158) and JADE (IMO 9418999), including serving as a billing company. UAE-based Glavos Shipping FZCO is a service provider to the Shamkhani fleet. Mohammad Reza Rahbar Madani, Hossein Ghorbani Zahed, Ali Rakhbarmadani, Asghar Aghili Dehkordi, Glavos Shipping FZCO, Dezera Shipping FZCO, Maksim Tsernosjov, Gautam Vishavdeep, Behzad Moghadas, and Jijin George are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. Al Kina Commercial Broker LLC is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ali Rakhbarmadani. Martin Austin Kaalund is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, House of Shipping Investment FZCO. Evorit Strategy Consulting LLC-FZ is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Martin Austin Kaalund. Alessandra Ronco is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Evorit Strategy Consulting LLC-FZ. Golden Nest Group Ltd and BSG Management Ltd are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hossein Ghorbani Zahed. SHAMKHANI’S CONTAINERIZED SHIPPING Singapore-based Sea Lead Shipping PTE. Ltd. (Sea Lead) and its subsidiaries Dubai-based Sea Lead Shipping DMCC , Marshall Islands-based Sea Lead Shipping Marshall Islands Ltd , and India-based Sea Lead Shipping Agency India Private Limited are key containerized shipping firms within the Shamkhani network, managing and operating a fleet of vessels carrying goods around the world. Sea Lead, its subsidiaries, and Dubai-based Volta Shipping Services LLC enable the network to carry licit and illicit goods to and from Iran, including to Iran-backed foreign terrorist organization Ansarallah , commonly known as the Houthis, in Yemen. Sea Lead is the manager and operator of Panama-flagged SHENTON WAY (IMO 9146314) and TANJONG PAGAR 1 (IMO 9404508), and Antigua and Barbuda-flagged PAYA LEBAR (IMO 9134232). Dubai-based We Freight Shipping LLC makes up part of the We Freight group of companies, with offices in UAE, India, and Thailand, that provide transportation intermediary services to meet the needs of the Shamkhani network’s container shipping businesses. The We Freight group of companies similarly allows for the blending of illicit and licit trade, with the proceeds of both ultimately benefiting Shamkhani. OFAC is also sanctioning the following vessels and associated companies operating as part of the Shamkhani containerized fleet and in Shamkhani-associated shipping networks. OFAC is designating the following owners and identifying their respective vessels as blocked property: Dubai-based Lubeck Shipping LLC , the owner and operator of Palau-flagged GEMMA (IMO 9509097); Marshall Islands-based Aare Lines Inc. , the owner and operator of St Kitts & Nevis-flagged NADIA (IMO 9122461); Marshall Islands-based Hope 1 Shipping Inc , the owner and operator of Antigua and Barbuda-flagged HOPE 1 (IMO 9514339); Hong Kong-based Ocean Searum One Limited , the owner and operator of Barbados-flagged ELPINIKI (IMO 9606015), also known as CORN; St Kitts & Nevis-based Nuvetrro Shipping Inc , the owner and operator of Antigua and Barbuda-flagged JADE (IMO 9418999); St Kitts & Nevis-based Veltrrivo Shipping Inc , the owner and operator of Antigua and Barbuda-flagged OPAL (IMO 9467158); and Marshall Islands-based Kangri 1 Inc , the owner and operator of Antigua and Barbuda-flagged CICCIO (IMO 9192442). Hong Kong-based Sai Wan Shipping Limited , one of the network’s many shipping firms, is the previous manager and operator of HOPE 1, ELPINIKI, JADE, and OPAL. As of March 2026, sanctioned House of Shipping’s group of companies included Sai Wan Shipping Limited, Sea Lead Shipping PTE. Ltd. and subsidiaries of Sea Lead Shipping PTE. Ltd., Sea Lead Shipping DMCC, and Sea Lead Shipping Marshall Islands Ltd. The Shamkhani fleet’s reach extends to the Caspian Sea, where it controls a group of container ships and cargo vessels primarily transporting goods between Iran and Russia. Shamkhani’s Caspian Sea fleet includes: Iran-flagged SEPEHR PAYAM (IMO 9110535), owned by Iran-based Ava Tarabar Darya Company ; Iran-flagged ERIKA (IMO 8721454), owned by the aforementioned Shamkhani financier Mohammad Reza Rahbar Madani; and Iran-flagged ARKANOOR 2 (IMO 8727848) and ARKANOOR 3 (IMO 8832083), both owned, operated, and managed by Iran-based Sepehr Noor Mobin Company . The fleet further includes four vessels with undisclosed ownership and governed by unknown flag states, which are known to operate for Shamkhani: SEA CRUISER (IMO 8729963); SEA CASTLE (IMO 8891572); SEA ANCHOR (IMO 8858099); and SEA GALLEON (IMO 8843666). OFAC is also sanctioning two tankers operating as part of Shamkhani’s fleet: DARIKA (IMO 9506693), owned by Marshall Islands-based Hansa Shipping Inc , and VIRENT (IMO 9332171), owned by Marshall Islands-based Platinum Knights Ltd . DARIKA and VIRENT have transported cargoes of Russian petroleum products for the Shamkhani network. Sea Lead Shipping PTE. Ltd. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. Sea Lead Shipping DMCC, Sea Lead Shipping Marshall Islands Ltd, and Sea Lead Shipping Agency India Private Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sea Lead Shipping PTE. Ltd. Volta Shipping Services LLC, We Freight Shipping LLC, Lubeck Shipping LLC, Aare Lines Inc., Hope 1 Shipping Inc, Ocean Searum One Limited, Nuvetrro Shipping Inc, Veltrrivo Shipping Inc, Ava Tarabar Darya Company, Sepehr Noor Mobin Company, Hansa Shipping Inc, Platinum Knights Ltd, Sai Wan Shipping Limited, and Kangri 1 Inc are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. ARKANOOR 2 and ARKANOOR 3 are being identified as blocked property in which Sepehr Noor Mobin Company has an interest. SHENTON WAY, TANJONG PAGAR 1, and PAYA LEBAR are being identified as blocked property in which Sea Lead Shipping PTE. Ltd. has an interest. SEPEHR PAYAM is being identified as blocked property in which Ava Tarabar Darya Company has an interest. ERIKA is being identified as blocked property in which Mohammad Reza Rahbar Madani has an interest. SEA CRUISER, SEA CASTLE, SEA ANCHOR, and SEA GALLEON are being identified as blocked property in which Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani has an interest. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, or 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Whistleblower Incentive Program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated and vessels identified as blocked property today . ###

Treasury International Capital Data for May

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 14, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury International Capital Data for May WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury today released Treasury International Capital (TIC) data for May 2026. The next release, which will report on data for June 2026, is scheduled for August 17, 2026. The sum total in May of all net foreign acquisitions of long-term securities, short-term U.S. securities, and banking flows was a net TIC inflow of $132.2 billion. Of this, net foreign private inflows were $172.0 billion, and net foreign official outflows were $39.9 billion. Foreign residents increased their holdings of long-term U.S. securities in May; their net purchases were $262.8 billion. Net purchases by private foreign investors were $246.8 billion, and net purchases by foreign official institutions were $16.1 billion. U.S. residents increased their holdings of long-term foreign securities, with net purchases of $30.1 billion. After including adjustments, such as estimated foreign portfolio acquisitions of U.S. stocks through stock swaps, overall net foreign purchases of long-term securities are estimated to have been $232.7 billion in May. Foreign residents decreased their holdings of U.S. Treasury bills by $43.5 billion. Foreign resident holdings of all dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities and other custody liabilities decreased by $30.6 billion. Banks’ own net dollar-denominated liabilities to foreign residents decreased by $70.0 billion. Complete data are available on the Treasury website here. ### About TIC Data The monthly data on holdings of long-term securities, as well as the monthly table on Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, reflect foreign holdings of U.S. securities collected primarily on the basis of custodial data. These data help provide a window into foreign ownership of U.S. securities, but they cannot attribute holdings of U.S. securities with complete accuracy. For example, if a U.S. Treasury security purchased by a foreign resident is held in a custodial account in a third country, the true ownership of the security will not be reflected in the data. The custodial data will also not properly attribute U.S. Treasury securities managed by foreign private portfolio managers who invest on behalf of residents of other countries. In addition, foreign countries may hold dollars and other U.S. assets that are not captured in the TIC data. For these reasons, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from TIC data about changes in the foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets by individual countries. PR table for press 2026 May.csv slt_table1 2026 May.csv slt_table4 2026 May.csv slt_table5 2026 May.csv npr_history 2026 May.csv