Comment on CFTC-2026-0331, CFTC-2026-0331-0001, Caleb, Fisher
Caleb FisherSupportIndividual
Summary: A college student who lost money on the Kalshi platform argues that prediction markets on political and other events are essentially gambling vehicles that lack legitimate commercial functions. The commenter urges the Commission to prohibit retail prediction markets, citing consumer harm and the potential for manipulation and misinformation.
I am a college student from Massachusetts, and I lost $9,300 trading on Kalshi. My experience is not just a personal financial setback it reflects the structural problems with prediction markets that the CFTC itself identifies in this ANPRM. The notice acknowledges that event contracts now cover political events, international events, scientific and cultural events, current events, and sporting events, and that some events are under the control of a single individual or small group of individuals. When a market allows people to bet on outcomes that can be influenced by individuals or small groups, it ceases to resemble a legitimate derivatives market and instead becomes a vehicle for manipulation, misinformation, and gaming. Massachusetts regulators reached a similar conclusion when the Massachusetts Securities Division initiated enforcement action against Kalshi, arguing that its political contracts constitute unregistered securities and expose retail investors to unacceptable information asymmetries. That action was not theoretical it was based on real consumer harm, the same kind of harm I experienced firsthand. As a student, I was not hedging any commercial risk; I was effectively gambling on political outcomes on a platform that presents itself as federally regulated and therefore trustworthy. The volatility, ambiguous resolution criteria, and insider information dynamics inherent to political event contracts make them fundamentally unsuitable for retail users and incompatible with the purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act. These markets do not provide meaningful price discovery, do not hedge economic exposure, and do not serve any legitimate commercial function. Instead, they incentivize behavior that undermines democratic processes and public trust. Given the clear statutory authority under CEA 5c(c)(5)(C) to prohibit contracts involving gaming or other activity contrary to the public interest, and given the concrete consumer harm already recognized by Massachusetts regulators, I urge the Commission to prohibit retail prediction markets like Kalshi from operating. My loss is one example of a broader pattern that will continue unless the Commission acts decisively.