Comment Submitted by Anonymous

AnonymousOpposeIndividual
Summary: An H-4 visa holder and derivative adjustment applicant opposes the proposed rule because it subjects her (c)(26) and (c)(9) employment authorizations to a criminal history presumption and redundant biometrics requirements. She argues that these measures create unnecessary risks for families with no new criminal history and requests specific exemptions for dismissed arrests and existing biometrics.
Docket No. USCIS-2026-0067 RIN 1615-AC98 Re: Clarification of Discretionary Employment Authorization for Certain Aliens, 91 FR 34352 I oppose the criminal history presumption and the biometrics requirement as applied, through 8 CFR 274a.12(c) and 274a.13, to the (c)(26) and (c)(9) categories. I am the H-4 spouse of an H-1B nonimmigrant in Austin, Texas. I work on a (c)(26) employment authorization document. My husband self-petitioned in the EB-1A extraordinary ability classification and USCIS approved it; I am a derivative applicant, my I-485 is pending, and I have also been granted a (c)(9) EAD. The rule does not tell me whether it reaches me. The preamble states that it amends 274a.12(c) to identify the categories that are currently non-discretionary, and concedes that provision may require edits at the final rule stage. It does not say whether (c)(26) or (c)(9) appears on that list. I cannot determine from the proposed text whether either of my work permits is covered. That is a notice defect independent of the merits, and it should be resolved before the final rule, when comment is closed. A derivative spouse is placed under the same presumption twice. Both categories I hold sit in 274a.12(c). Every renewal of each card would be a separate discretionary adjudication on the same unchanged record. A second look at an unchanged record produces no new information and no security benefit. It produces a second opportunity for an inconsistent outcome, and a second point of failure for a household built around lawful work authorization. The American-worker rationale does not reach this population. The preamble supports it with figures from the (c)(11), (c)(14), and (c)(18) populations. H-4 employment authorization exists only where the principal has an approved I-140 -- a finding the Department already made that this household's presence and work benefit the country. Extending to (c)(26) a justification developed for three categories the Department did analyze is not reasoned decision making. The rule never explains why an arrest that ended in dismissal should count against an applicant. It discusses only non-conviction outcomes involving an agreement imposing punishment or restraint -- diversion, deferred adjudication, expunged records -- where the applicant accepted something in exchange. That reasoning does not transfer to a charge dismissed outright, where nothing was bargained for, yet the first prong sweeps it in, triggered by arrest alone. Having explained the harder case, the Department cannot leave the easier one unaddressed. Derivative status leaves no independent remedy. I cannot self-petition and no employer can file on my behalf. If either card is denied in discretion, there is no alternative filing and no review. Expanding automatic termination under 274a.14(a)(1) to reach denial of the underlying application compounds this: as a derivative, my I-485 can be denied on a determination made in my husband's case, ending my work authorization immediately, with no notice period and no wind-down. The Department should state what becomes of a derivative's employment authorization while a timely motion to reopen is pending. The reliance interests here are current, not hypothetical. I am employed on this authorization now. Our child is a United States citizen. We bought a home on two incomes, in reliance on work permits the government granted and has renewed. A discretionary denial on a record that produced no conviction means lost income, mortgage default, and a citizen child's family choosing between separation and departure. Section IV.H addresses reliance interests of certain aliens with current employment authorization. It should address derivative spouses employed on (c)(26) and (c)(9) as well. Repeat biometrics are duplicative. I submitted biometrics with the I-485 and have cleared background checks. Requiring them again at each filing adds cost and a new failure mode -- denial for a missed appointment -- with no security benefit for someone already vetted. Requests: (1) State expressly whether (c)(26) and (c)(9) are among the currently non-discretionary categories. (2) Exclude eligibility-based categories -- (c)(26), (c)(9), (c)(3) -- and retain individualized review. (3) If any presumption is retained, exclude arrests not resulting in conviction -- dismissal, acquittal, and declination absent an agreement imposing a penalty, supervision, or restraint on liberty. (4) Exempt applicants whose biometrics are already on file from a concurrent or recent filing. (5) Provide that where a card has already been granted after review of a criminal record, a renewal presenting no new history is not subject to a fresh presumption. (6) Address in Section IV.H the reliance interests of derivative spouses employed on (c)(26) or (c)(9) authorization. Respectfully, A concerned H-4 spouse and derivative adjustment applicant, TX

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