Nicole B

I have the following concerns about this proposed rule: The proposed rule states “a permitted payment stablecoin issuer that has properly established an effective AML/CFT program would not be subject to an AML/CFT enforcement action” and that “Under such a consultation framework, before initiating such an action, the OCC would provide the Director of FinCEN with an opportunity to review the action and would consider any input offered by the Director of FinCEN, which may include any view as to the effectiveness of the permitted payment stablecoin issuer's AML/CFT program.” I am concerned that the OCC is creating an enforcement carve-out for issuers that it determines have “effective compliance programs”. No stablecoin issuer should be exempt from enforcement and supervisory actions, no matter how effective their compliance programs are. Can the OCC explain how it will maintain neutrality in determining which institutions are eligible for a carve-out under this rule? For example, the World Liberty Trust Company is seeking to become an uninsured national trust bank, and this institution has connections to the President, senior government officials, their families, and foreign governments. If public officials and foreign governments are going to financially benefit from such an enforcement carve-out, or harm consumers based on lack of enforcement, the public has a right to know. How will the OCC maintain independence and not bow to political pressure or foreign interference? I am also concerned that the OCC is routing its enforcement actions through the Director of FinCEN. The OCC is an independent bureau, with the Comptroller being appointed directly by the President and not the Treasury Secretary. While it might be necessary to involve and work with the Director of FinCEN, the OCC is responsible for its own enforcement and supervision. It should not be notifying and allowing other departments to involve themselves before undertaking enforcement actions. Can the OCC explain how routing enforcement through the Treasury Department will NOT result in protection for politically connected institutions, such as World Liberty Trust Company? If the President, his family, senior government and elected officials, or foreign governments are financially involved in an institution issuing stablecoin, how will the OCC ensure the public that these entities are subject to the same laws and enforcement that other stablecoin issuers are? How can the OCC guarantee it won’t be influenced by political pressure? One way the OCC can address these concerns is by requiring that any stablecoin issuer operating as an uninsured bank publicly name the people who own and profit from it, the people who keep the interest the reserve earns, as well as any foreign investors before qualifying under this rule. This way, we can police the risks that this rule is designed to catch. The OCC should also give harder reviews to any stablecoin issuer whose ownership is connected to elected officials, senior government officials, their families, and foreign governments. Thank you for your consideration.