Comment on FR Doc # 2026-12725 from Robert Neches

My qualifications to offer informed commentary on this topic include 50 years as a research scientist and manager, experience as a DARPA program manager, and as a senior executive level official who served in both what was then called the Office of Secretary of Defense, and in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. I have worked with NSF as a proposal reviewer, and as a collaborator on joint projects with DARPA and OSD. NSF proposes to adapt to Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Uniform Guidance at 2 CFR 200 through the proposed rule published on May 29, 2026 (see 91 Fed. Reg. 32, 198, May 29, 2026). This is flawed for multiple reasons: 1.NSF’s changes should not be proposed and opened for comment unless and until all adaptations to external rules are based on finalized versions of those rules. OMB’s guidance is not final and may change, NSF’s proposed changes therefore cannot be properly evaluated because the context for evaluation is incomplete. 2.Should OMB’s ill-advised guidance be adopted, mooting the preceding objection, NSF’s failure to revise the merit review guidance (draft Guidance on Assistance, Guide 8, pp. 104-110) to reflect the proposed effective politicization of selection decisions to, “ensur[e] that discretionary award advance the President’s policy priorities,” (OMB Section 200.205). Following this requirement in the absence of substantial revisions to Guide 8 would make it impossible for proposal respondants to make submission decisions. This would create an enormous waste of both submitter and government time preparing and reviewing doomed proposals, accompanied by a signficant loss of quality when potential quality submitters refrain from proposing over uncertainty about their prospects. Proposal submission cost and quality on both government and submitter sides will be irreparably damaged if submitters do not have sufficient information to ensure whether their proposals have viable prospects. This will be impossible in the absence of a reliable mechanism for NSF to convey to potential proposers: what those priorities are, how they are relevant to the topic at hand, and how long those priorities will be in place before changing. The possibility of creating such a mechanism is vanishingly small. The current proposed revisions are therefore fboth flawed and incomplete, and will only reduce performance and effectiveness. 3.Even should the preceding concerns be addressable, two additional fundamental problems remain bearing on the bureaucratic load that will be introduced: a.It is not at all clear that Presidential policy priorities are a permissable consideration under laws governing the establishment of the NSF, as well as those governing Congressional Authorizations and Appropriations. Selection decisions made under them are potentially subject to legal action. b.The logistics of requiring senior appointees to determine compliance with those policies given the volume and complexity of NSF submissions renders the requirement logistically infeasible. Proposal processing will be bottlenecked to the point of breakdown. 4.Finally, by incorporating political decisionmaking into the process, NSF will both damage its ability to do the best science, and reduce US international competitive prospects through the loss of scientists, e.g., Forbes Magazine, July 15 article: “Why a Nobel Laureate is Leaving UC Berkeley for China.”