Comment on FR Doc # N/A

Makita ThatcherSupportIndividual
Summary: Makita R Thatcher, a concerned member of the public, supports the rule providing Counter-UAS authority to state and local agencies but emphasizes the need for strict safeguards. The commenter urges the government to include specific requirements for data minimization, public reporting, audit access, and clear definitions of credible threats to prevent mission creep and protect civil liberties.
Comment re: Counter-UAS Authority for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement and Correctional Agencies I submit this comment regarding the interim final rule implementing Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System authority for state, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement and correctional agencies. I recognize the legitimate public-safety concerns underlying this rule. Unauthorized drones can threaten airports, correctional facilities, critical infrastructure, mass gatherings, sporting events, emergency response, and public safety. The rule also reflects real operational limits: federal personnel cannot be present at every location where a drone threat may arise. My concern is not whether drone threats exist. My concern is how expanded technical authority is governed once it is delegated, scaled, and used outside direct federal presence. Counter-UAS authority can involve detection, identification, monitoring, tracking, warning, confiscation, disruption, control, disabling, or destruction of unmanned aircraft. Some of these actions may involve access to electronic communications, use of electromagnetic tools, operational coordination with federal agencies, and potential effects on bystanders, operators, lawful drone users, news gatherers, protesters, or nearby communications systems. That kind of authority should be usable only with clear safeguards. I respectfully urge DOJ and DHS to ensure that the final framework includes: 1. clear public definitions of what qualifies as a credible threat; 2. strict limits on use at protests, First Amendment activity, public assemblies, and ordinary civic events unless a specific safety threat is documented; 3. strong data minimization rules for any communications, location, identifying, or operator information collected through detection or tracking systems; 4. clear retention limits and deletion requirements for information unrelated to a documented threat; 5. public reporting in aggregate on how often C-UAS authority is used, by what type of agency, at what category of location, and with what result; 6. after-action documentation for each mitigation action, including the factual basis, technology used, coordination performed, and whether any collateral effects occurred; 7. audit access for appropriate federal oversight bodies; 8. complaint and review pathways for affected drone operators or members of the public; 9. clear consequences for unauthorized or improperly documented use; and 10. special safeguards for correctional settings, where security needs are real but transparency is often weakest. The central principle should be simple: Power that can detect, track, intercept, disable, or destroy should also be traceable, reviewable, and bounded. This rule emphasizes training, certification, authorized technologies, coordination, privacy protections, audits, and reporting. Those safeguards are important. But the public record should show how they will work in practice, not merely that they exist on paper. The agencies should also be careful that “large-scale public gatherings” does not become an open-ended category allowing routine surveillance or technical intervention at events where the actual concern is speech, dissent, crowd management, or administrative convenience rather than a specific UAS threat. Similarly, correctional facilities raise genuine contraband and safety concerns, but they also present heightened risks of low-visibility authority. C-UAS use in and around prisons should be documented with particular care. I urge DOJ and DHS to preserve a clear administrative record explaining how federal oversight will prevent mission creep, how privacy protections will be enforced, how improper use will be detected, and how members of the public may seek review when C-UAS authority affects them. Safety and accountability are not opposing goals. The stronger and more technical the authority, the more important it is that the public can see the wiring. Thank you for considering this comment. Respectfully submitted, Makita R Thatcher Macon, Georgia Concerned member of the public

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