Comment on FR Doc # N/A

This comment is submitted in formal OPPOSITION to the Interim Final Rule published under Docket ID: FBI-2026-0001-0002, concerning the expansion of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) authority to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement. While framed as a critical tool for public safety optimization and addressing emerging aerial threats, the rule as drafted creates a severe, unchecked mechanism for administrative surveillance, overreaches explicit statutory boundaries under recent Article III precedents, and openly violates binding executive regulatory management mandates. By decentralizing highly intrusive signal interception and electronic tracking capabilities to local authorities without rigorous, individualized judicial oversight, this rule compromises the fundamental constitutional liberties of everyday citizens and small operators. SUMMARY OF COMMENT Fourth Amendment Violations and Search Frameworks: The rule authorizes electronic interception and tracking mechanisms that bypass necessary warrant requirements, running afoul of the Supreme Court's mandate in Chatrie v. United States (2026) regarding digital location privacy and tracking. Violation of Executive Architecture: The rule introduces extensive administrative and enforcement frameworks without satisfying the strict regulatory budget mandates under Executive Order 14219's 10-for-1 Offset Rule. Severe Lack of Explicit Statutory Authority (Loper Bright): The agencies lack the explicit, clear congressional delegation required to expand sweeping communications interception capabilities to regional entities, failing the modern standard of independent statutory interpretation. ARGUMENT I. Infringement on Digital Privacy and Fourth Amendment Standards The rule permits local operators to detect, monitor, intercept, and track electronic communications of unmanned aircraft systems without obtaining a traditional, individualized judicial warrant. In Chatrie v. United States (609 U.S. ____, June 29, 2026), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that individuals retain a robust, constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in their digital telemetry and location records. Intercepting electronic data transmissions, parsing signal identifiers, or seizing control of hardware constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. Delegating broad electronic interception capabilities to regional agencies without binding them to an explicit warrant protocol introduces systemic, warrantless administrative surveillance that violates Chatrie and Carpenter v. United States. II. Open Defiance of the 10-for-1 Regulatory Offset Mandate Beyond structural constitutional defects, this rulemaking directly violates binding executive architecture. Under Executive Order 14219, federal agencies are restricted by a strict regulatory budget mandate—the "10-for-1 Offset Rule." This directive mandates that for every new regulation that introduces compliance burdens, administrative machinery, or enforcement expansion, the agency must completely rescind ten active regulations to offset the growth of the administrative state. The FBI and DOJ have completely failed to execute or identify the ten mandatory rescissions required to offset this highly burdensome and expansive framework, rendering the rule procedurally defective. III. Lack of Clear Congressional Authorization Under Loper Bright Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), courts no longer defer to an agency’s self-serving reading of its own statutory reach. The Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511) and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) strictly prohibit unauthorized communication interception and computer access. The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 provided narrow, centralized exceptions for federal assets—not an open-ended blank check to dynamically delegate sweeping electronic surveillance powers to thousands of regional SLTT departments. Without explicit, unambiguous statutory text from Congress, this expansion represents an unconstitutional expansion of Article II power into Article I domains. REQUESTED ACTION & CONCLUSION The commenter respectfully requests that the FBI and DOJ immediately withdraw this interim rule. The agencies must halt implementation until they fully comply with the 10-for-1 regulatory offset mandate, insert robust judicial warrant protocols that comply with Chatrie, and limit technical intercepts to explicit statutory parameters set by Congress.