Comment from Anonymous

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Docket No: CFPB-2026-0016 This proposal represents a significant step away from the Constitution's preference for limited and clearly defined government powers and toward a model in which administrative officials exercise increasingly subjective discretion over the rights and reputations of individual citizens. Specifically, the proposed Routine Use (18) at 91 FR 29466 would authorize disclosure of employee records to the news media and public whenever CFPB leadership subjectively determines there is a "legitimate public interest". This reflects a troubling expansion of administrative power that, though framed as a transparency measure, weakens privacy protections established by the Privacy Act and creates new risks to due process, reputational rights, and individual liberty for civil servants at this one agency only, the CFPB. The Privacy Act of 1974 was enacted after Watergate and other abuses precisely because Americans feared the accumulation and misuse of personal information by federal agencies. Routine Use (18) turns that purpose on its head. Instead of limiting dissemination of personnel records, the CFPB proposes creating a new avenue for public disclosure whenever agency leadership concludes that disclosure serves "the Bureau's" institutional interests.This is inapposite to the principle that government agencies should exercise only statutory powers clearly delegated by Congress. The Privacy Act was designed as a shield for citizens and employees, not as a public-relations tool for agencies. The Bureau's authority to disclose records should therefore be construed narrowly. Additionally, the same officials whose reputation may be implicated by a controversy would have authority to disclose employee information to "preserve confidence in the integrity of the Bureau." This creates exactly the kind of unchecked administrative discretion that the Constitution seeks to prevent through separation of powers and checks and balances. James Madison warned in Federalist No. 47 against the accumulation of power in the same hands. Further, "legitimate public interest," "preserve confidence," and "demonstrate accountability" have no objective definition and create a risk that disclosure decisions become influenced by: political priorities, media pressure, ideological disagreements, leadership changes, personal vendettas, employee participation in protected union activity, or efforts to shape public narratives. One administration may deem disclosure necessary to demonstrate accountability. Another may use the same authority to publicly identify employees whose views or conduct conflict with agency leadership. Vague delegations permit arbitrary government action. The Constitution protects liberty by requiring rules rather than discretion. The Fifth Amendment also provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Although reputation alone is not always a protected liberty interest, courts have long recognized that government actions causing reputational damage can implicate due-process concerns when accompanied by adverse employment consequences. Routine Use (18) allows disclosure before: a formal finding, an adjudication, completion of an investigation, or judicial review. Under the Bill of Rights, individuals are presumed innocent, accusations should be tested through established procedures, and government should not use its information monopoly to influence public opinion against a person who has not received due process. Routine Use (18) is a threat to employees and creates a chilling effect on raising concerns, reporting wrongdoing, participating in internal disputes, seeking mediation, joining employee organizations such as unions, or exercising workplace rights. Also, the First Amendment protects free expression and association. Government policies that create fear of public exposure burden those rights even without directly prohibiting speech. The CFPB justifies the proposal by stating that it adopts a standard similar to that used under the Freedom of Information Act. However, FOIA and Routine Use (18) operate differently. Under FOIA: a requester seeks records; exemptions are applied; courts can review agency decisions; disclosure decisions occur within an established statutory framework. Routine Use (18): authorizes proactive agency disclosures; allows agency leadership to initiate publicity; may occur without an external request; may not receive meaningful judicial review before release. The existence of FOIA does not justify creating a separate discretionary authority for public dissemination. Indeed, Congress already established the mechanism for balancing transparency and privacy through FOIA. The CFPB should rely on existing FOIA processes, congressional oversight, and existing human resource mechanisms in the CFPB and federal government that preserve both transparency and individual liberty.